

# 19<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress. Global challenges for foreign policy and external relations

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# What about the size, scope and features of the Chinese global ambition?

International implications of Chinese modernization? After the congress, Inside/outside; China makes foreign policy through domestic modernization, multidimensional external policies and a new World vision of China as a global power. The relevant soft power and moral leadership of a **qualitative growth model and its implications for global governance**

- a) The China's path offers a new option of sustainable, law based and social modernization not only to Chinese people but also to other countries who want to speed up their development while preserving independence : self definition as a developing country and leader of developing countries
- b) this Chinese long term approach to solve global challenges this commitment to international cooperation to forge « a world community of shared destiny » happens in a troubled and competitive global context ahead of the design of restoring China's regional and global primacy, raising anxieties and worries in India, Japan and feeding populist manipulation of the revolt of Western losers: protectionisms, and competitive projects like the « free and open Indo-Pacific strategy »

**5 questions to be addressed in** a non diplomaic way while looking for convergence<sub>2</sub>

## AFTER THE CCP CONGRESS: 5 questions

### 1) Is the China's military perspective a defensive approach or aimed at balancing the USA within the next 15 years?

- P. 47/48 A two steps program: “A military is built to fight. Our military must regard combat capability as the criterion to meet in all its work and focus on how to win when it is called on. We will take solid steps to ensure military preparedness for all strategic directions, and **make progress in combat readiness in both traditional and new security fields**. We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our **people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces**”
- P 53: “China pursues a national defense policy that is in **nature defensive**. China's development does not pose a threat to any other country. No matter what stage of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage “
- China acts both as innovative trade and economic power ( like the EU) and as a traditional hard power ( concept of balance of power? « building a powerful military with Chinese characteristics ») ....**Strong, modernized, ready to fight, but defensive**

# To what extent is a rebalanced multipolarity realistic?

## Defense budgets in 2016 (in US\$, SIPRI, 2017 Report)

-USA (3,3% GDP): 611.186.Million. However 2018: \$824.6 B –

China (1,9% GDP): 215.176 .The gap is increasing every year .....

-Russia (5,3%): 69.245

-Japan (1%): 46126 (48 B in 2018). India (2,5%): 55.923. S.Arabia: 44.243

-non coordinated EU states (declining budgets since 1990): 55.745 (2,3%,Fr), 41.067 (1,2%,Ger), 27.934 (It, 1,5%), 14.893 (Sp,1%), 48.263(UK , 1,9%, before Brexit): ‘

1)\*Talking about a trend towards « unipolarity » would be wrong ( relevant differences even between Bush and Trump).

2)However, emphasizing «a new bipolar confrontation» or « bipolar balance of power » would'nt be realistic but mere rethorics (as well as talking of « G2 » during H Clinton and B Obama era).

# After the CCP congress: question 2

Why has the concept of «**multilateralism**» («**M**») never been mentioned in a 65 pages Xi Jinping speech, while it was part of the official discourse and practice since many years, notably during Hu Jintao era ( Yuan Feng thesis, 2016)?

- **Answer 1** by CFAU president Qin Yaqin: it is **implicit in global and regional policy-making**: "Belt and Road, AIIB, Silk Road Fund, First Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, G20 2016 Summit in Hangzhou, the BRICS Summit in Xiamen, and the 4th Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia" .

**It is to a large extent a convincing answer.** Furthermore: UN, UNSC ( Syria and N. Korea sanctions) , WTO panels, COP 21 (Davos speech; relevant trade openness) , ASEAN plus 3 and plus 6, AIIB. However,

- **Answer 2** by other comments: «**M**» could be considered as a «**Western idea**», rich in dangerous domestic implications («rule of law»). This is true to some extent. In this case: what is the real difference between «rule of law» and «Chinese understanding of rule of law»? Where is the main difference with the EU meaning?(the judiciary dimension, anti-corruption reforms, and transparency and administrative rules).

# Third question after the CCP Congress

Deepening the link between **inside and outside**? The historical roots of ideational differences

- a) **The economic dimension**: China shifts from export led to domestic market-led economic growth (sustainable): trade tariff from 17% to 7% : political implications of trade openness: f.e. The ecological modernization and the GLOBAL ECOSYSTEM
- b) **On the other hand, the political dimension**: could enhanced domestic authoritarianism support a sustainable international peace policy?
  - The Western tradition of political thought from Rousseau and Kant to the 'European unity' idea was founding a sustainable peace policy on domestic individual liberties, constitutional freedom and human rights.
  - This difference has to do with **alternative ideas of « freedom »** between China and Europe . This difference is already aware in the political thought of Sun Yat Sen (internal individual freedom? or freedom of the country against international imperialism?) as pre-condition for peace policy? On this point, the China political thought overlaps with anti-colonial movements for independence and post-colonial thought (which is confirmed by the self definition of China as a 'developing country').
  - **This relevant difference** deserves conceptualization though a deeper dialogue which can only be proficuous if starts by critical distance and innovative thought towards convergence

# Realistic? Yes , Xi Jinping looks as wishing dialogue and new thinking for global governance

- P. 21/ 22. (13). And 53/55: “Promoting the building of a community with a **shared future for mankind** “
- “The dream of the Chinese people is closely connected with the dreams of the peoples of other countries; the Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order.
- “We must keep in mind both our internal and international imperatives, stay on the path of peaceful development, and continue to pursue a **mutually beneficial strategy of opening up**. We will uphold justice while pursuing shared interests, and will **foster new thinking** on common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. We will pursue open, **innovative**, and inclusive development that benefits everyone; boost cross-cultural exchanges characterized by harmony within diversity, inclusiveness, and **mutual learning**; and cultivate ecosystems based on respect for nature and green development.
- “China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order”

## Question 4. China and global governance: do we also need discussing about theoretical innovation as International relations are concerned?

It is true that the concept of 'non-interference' is based on an idea of sovereignty consistent with the Westphalian understanding of inter-states relations. This brings many Chinese scholars to identify with US neo-realism (K Waltz and his « back to the future » school)

However, the Chinas' practical foreign policy is to some extent **already** beyond some of the Westphalian principles, which may back more courageous theory innovation:

- China supported K Annan **Responsibility to protect** in 2005 and did abstain (like Germany) in UNSC in 2011 vote regarding the **R2P** Un mission in Libya which was focusing, in its first stage, to protect Libyan Benghazi people from Kaddafi aggression (even if it was disappointed by the next evolution of NATO intervention, which is understandable)
- China welcomes the **WTO** supranational panels which can also condemn USA, EU and China
- China is committed to a regional organization ('ASEAN plus 1', 'A.plus 3' and 'A.plus 6') which include to a certain degree supranationalism (ASEAN Charta, Asean haze emission arrangement...), supports African Union and European Union, including their supranational features, beyond the traditional concept of non interference
- China welcomes the increasing and multidimensional institutionalization of EU-China partnership ( issue linkage, diffuse reciprocity...)

# A new shared research agenda

- My research hypothesis and my question to the panel: China is far beyond the Mao understanding of national sovereignty and non-interference and shares the idea that « multilateralism matters »: all my previous examples bring some relevant arguments
- Chinese International relations scholars should be more open to developments converging with the neo-institutionalist school of international relations: from hegemonic institutionalism to new multilateral institutionalism
- The US led multilateralism was de facto a **sovereignty enhancing multilateralism**: it still works to some extent (unanimous sanctions against South Africa, against Syria, against Iran, against N.Korea): however its outcomes are fragile and it is asymmetrical and Donald Trump wants to dismantel multilateralism because it is sovereignty pooling
- Why a new Chinese IR theory is not only theoretically but practically urgent? **Global challenges (defined as issues who are threating the human kind as such, and which can only addressed by international cooperation)** are transnational in nature and are beyond the power of a single Sovereign state: for example, Nuclear , chimical and biological weapons proliferation, Financial instability, Terrorism, Global warming, Epidemic diseases, Extreme poverty, Refugees and migration flows. They challenge POLITICS

## Outcome of collective and ongoing research

# A COLLECTIVE RESEARCH PROJECT

Edited by  
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## Deepening the EU-China Partnership

Bridging Institutional and  
Ideational Differences in an  
Unstable World

  
The  
Globalisation,  
Europe, Multilateralism  
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Thank you very much for your  
attention!

# alternative scenarios for global governance and their preconditions

In the context of the current decline of the past global liberal order, competitive trends, nationalism, protectionism, ethno-nationalist tendencies, religious fundamentalism, weakening global multilateralism, global governance is open to alternative scenarios

## Past scenario:

The failed Obama attempt of reviving the « Trilateral governance » (USA,EU,Japan) by TTIP and TPP cannot be replaced by an alternative Trilateral leadership ( USA,EU, China) and, even less, by a G2 (because the US are dismantling multilateral regimes, which is critically analyzed by the main US political scientists (Kupchan, Keohane, Zacharia, Ikenberry...; and because other actors would negatively react :India, Japan, Russia..

## As a consequence two alternatives,

- a) either a very **dangerous scenario** including both attempts of military balance of power, increasing divergences and fragmentation of global governance (a-polarity: N Korea, Iran, Middle East, Africa, Ukraine...). EU marginalized and possible US-China military conflict ( war by incident)
- b) Or a new multilateralism scenario. What we mean? The EU-china partnership as an example

# 5. The cooperation partnerships and the alliances

- *USA? What about the mixed message of the Trump visit: a coalition against NK on the one hand and a reject of multilateralism on the other? Is there any plausible solution to the North Korea nuclear crisis and what should the role of EU be?*
- China's soft power, Panda diplomacy : how to explain the elevation and toughening of the CCP « United front » work department?
- China and Russia, cooperating but not allies:
  - a) On the one hand, bilateral relations plus SCO
  - b) On the other hand hard balance between an emerging power and a declining power. Competition: the example of Southern Caucasus (BTK and/or TIAG?)
- China and Africa
- China and EU: political partnership and economic competition?

## Three major global actors (US, China and EU) between institutionalization and confrontation

- 1) **The Europe-USA partnership** used to be (since 1945) economically symbiotic and a politically based on a strong alliance during the Cold War. However, transatlantic rift, the freezing of TTIP, unilateral Trump declarations of « NATO as obsolete » are provoking perceptions of increasing distrust, divergences about multilateralism and regional cooperation, and unprecedented declaration by A. Merkel that the « Europeans should take their destiny on their own shoulder » (literature about « the divided West », Habermas and others). However, in spite of divergences, no single security dilemma exists and EU-US share the agenda against Islamist terrorism.
- 2) **The US-China relationship** is institutionalized both bilaterally and within UNSC(1972), WTO (2001) and other global organization. However, discontinuity, oscillations, mutual frustrations, recent unpredictability, and competing interests are currently provoking: a) threat of trade wars, b) security dilemma in the Pacific and risk of incident in the South China Sea and NWA; b) distrust, with the single exception of the unanimous sanctions against N Korea voted by UNSC. C) military confrontation? **USA defense budget 2016** (3,3% GDP): 611.186.Million. (However 2018: \$824.6 B - **China** (1,9% GDP): 215.176 .The gap is increasing every year ..... **Wrong talking about new bipolarism.**
- 3) **The EU-China partnership** partnership is particularly multidimensional and institutionalized, it represents objective factors of international stability within an increasingly unpredictable world: it excludes security dilemmas and combines bilateralism, interregionalism and multilateralism

# EU-China partnership as a new multilateral model: gradual steps towards further institutionalization of the international life

A process of expanding and deepening what is already existing between EU and China: multilevel institutionalized cooperation ( bilateral, interregional, multilateral), not only as a factor of global stability but as **gradually building a collective leadership** of reformed multilateral cooperation scenario : combining bilateralism with **G 20 and UN (UNSC, COP 21..)** looks as the best institutional way to make real progress in this direction.

## However, there are some preconditions, among them:

- A)China gradually upgrading its multilateral commitment beyond instrumental and sovereignty enhancing multilateralism at regional and global level. ‘
- B)EU reacting to Brexit and current challenges through **differentiated integration**, which entails a politically integrated hard core (internal and internat. security policies) and a more consistent, differentiated, flexible trade and foreign policy.
- C)EU and China ( and allies within UN and WTO) jointly managing the unpredictable leaders (Kim, Assad, Maduro.) as well as the unpredictable sides of US foreign policy, through domestic (civil society) pressures in the USA, bilateral and multilateral proposals to the US administration, notably during the next 3 ½ Y