

Breaking the South Korea-Japan Stalemate: A European Opportunity

February 2014

Matteo Quattrocchi¹

The relations between Japan and South Korea have substantially deteriorated in the last years. As the security situation in East Asia seems more and more likely to lead to an arms race and maritime confrontations, it would be fundamental to recompose the relationship between two of the most stable partners of the EU in the area. The EU has demonstrated its capabilities and abilities in conflict resolution negotiations, especially on disputes related to historic traumas, therefore it appears to be particularly suited for a rapprochement between Japan and South Korea.

While historically rooted disputes are often more complex than all-out conflicts, the EU was specifically created with the objective of uniting Europe, mediating between the numerous regional and local differences of the continent. The possibility of appealing to the shared values between the three parties, the substantial economic interests, and counting on the support of the U.S., ever interested in a stable East Asia, make so that an active engagement of the EU in the area would prove fruitful and effective.

EU-Asia at a Glance is a publication series about the current state of affairs in Asia and EU-Asia relations

This paper expresses the view of the authors and not the European Institute for Asian Studies

¹ Matteo Quattrocchi is a Junior Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies



Introduction

EU interests in East Asia have been, traditionally, mainly focused on economics, in the attempt to further stimulate trade and investment flows. Nevertheless, an improved interest and willingness to increase the EU's standing as a security actor in the region is growing. The EU has found extremely reliable, and like-minded, partners in East Asia, in particular Japan's and South Korea's participation in many international peacekeeping missions has created a long standing relationship that has moved beyond mere economic interests.

It is in this context that the current state of regional tensions in East Asia is set. Japan and South Korea are growing more and more apart, despite substantial interests in common, for one reining in North Korea's intemperance. Japan's territorial disputes, and the resulting nationalistic chest-bumping, have increasingly worsened its standing amongst its neighbours, entangling it in a vicious spiral of strained relations with China – as the Senkaku/Diaoyu affair is more and more likely to lead to an all-out arms race² – and South Korea – where the national discourse towards Japan is returning to the traditional imperialistic characterisation. Moreover, the tri-lateral meetings between China, Japan and South Korea have been suspended until further notice since the beginning of 2013, and are unlikely to be scheduled anytime soon.³

While mending the Senkaku dispute would require more than mediation, it may not be the case for the South Korea-Japan relation. The possible role of the EU as a mediator, with vested interests in a rapprochement, possibly with the support of the U.S., would at one time recompose a stable and reliable platform of shared values and interests and further increase the international standing of the EU as a credible diplomatic and security partner.

Japan: coping with recovery

Ever since the election of Shinzō Abe, Japan has taken a more and more assertive stance towards its regional neighbours. Undoubtedly, Abe inherited from the Noda government the Senkaku dispute, which was bound to exacerbate the relations with China. Nevertheless, the uncompromising stance towards China, and later towards South Korea, has further strained the relations with the other major powers in East Asia.

At the beginning of 2013, Japan was facing a concerning economic slump, due to the succession of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, and the subsequent 2007-2008 global financial meltdown. Abe's government undertook a sizable plan of stimulus to the national economy (rebranded *Abenomics*), structured in "three arrows": increasing its spending – despite the looming menace of an almost 240 percent national debt –, an aggressive monetary policy by the Bank of Japan aiming at a 2 percent inflation rate and a series of structural reforms to re-vitalise private investments.⁴ While Abe's program is still developing, it appears to have slightly awakened Japan's economy, while

² Takenaka, K. (2014, January 23). Abe sees World War One echoes in Japan-China tensions. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-japan-china-idUSBREA0M08G20140123>.

³ Asahi (2013, November 8). Senior diplomats from Japan, S. Korea, China fail to break the ice. *Asahi Shimbun*. Retrieved from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201311080094.

⁴ Harner, S. (2013, March 2). The Abe/Aso Government "Three Arrows" Agenda for Economic Revival. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2013/02/03/the-abeaso-government-three-arrows-agenda-for-economic-revival/>.



strengthening the country's confidence.⁵ Economic recovery was, and is today, but a part of the mark left by the Abe administration, as increased nationalism within the country, paired with a more assertive foreign policy, have also characterised Japan's international stance.

As the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute flared up, Japanese rhetoric also took a turn for a more nationalistic approach. The protection of the sacred motherland boundaries, and the assertion of Japan's interests in the face of over-extending neighbours eventually substantiated in straining the relations also with South Korea, albeit not without some external help.⁶ The frequent visits of Japanese politicians, and members of the ruling coalition, to the Yasukuni shrine – where 14 Class A war criminals are interred – led to vehement protests by many countries occupied by imperial Japan during World War II. In time, the continental anti-Japanese sentiment grew towards an almost explicit diplomatic strain, as the traditional tri-lateral yearly meetings between Japan, China and South Korea have been suspended until further notice.

While a general anti-Japanese feeling has always been present in continental East Asia,⁷ the recent deterioration of Japan-South Korea relations is concerning. As the Senkaku/Diaoyu affair has become a regional issue, so did the general feeling of an overreaching Japan. Without going as far as calling Japan a villain,⁸ South Korea has indeed frozen its relations with it. The usual point of dispute between the two countries is the perceived Japanese failure, from the Korean perspective, to fully redress the WWII crimes, both in formal apologies and in economic terms. It is exemplary that in July 2013, a Korean court ordered Mitsubishi to compensate five Korean families whose relatives had been forced into labour during Japan's rule.⁹ Moreover, the constant visits to the Yasukuni shrine, and the inopportune remarks by some high-level politicians regarding the treatment of Korean women by Japanese soldiers,¹⁰ have contributed to the reprise of anti-Japanese feelings. While the war compensation issue appears to be more demagogic than substantial – as recent documents proved that post-war compensation¹¹ was settled between the two countries, with the South Korean government of the time (1965) preferring a state-to-state reparation, rather than directly to its surviving citizens¹² – the constant reminder of Japan's brutal WWII past, mostly at the hands of Japanese politicians,¹³ has done incalculable damage to the relations

⁵ Stiglitz, J.E. (2013, April 4). The Promise of Abenomics. *CFO Insight*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfo-insight.com/markets-economy/global-economy/the-promise-of-abenomics/>.

⁶ Kyodo/AFP (2014, January 20). Korean who assassinated Japan's first leader honored in China. *Kyodo/AFP*. Retrieved from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/20/national/korean-who-assassinated-japans-first-leader-honored-in-china/#.Ut01nRA1jDc>.

⁷ Cossa, R.A., (2012, July). Japan-South Korea Relations: Time to Open Both Eyes. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/japan-south-korea-relations-time-open-both-eyes/p28736>.

⁸ Liu Xiaoming (2014, January 1). China and Britain won the war together. *Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/10546442/Liu-Xiaoming-China-and-Britain-won-the-war-together.html>.

⁹ Rochan, M. (2013, July 30). Korean Court Orders Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy To Compensate Victims of Colonial Forced Labour. *International Business Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mitsubishi-heavy-industries-nippon-steel-busan-high-495537>.

¹⁰ Tabuchi, H. (2013, May 13). Women Forced Into WWII Brothels Served Necessary Role, Osaka Mayor Says. *New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/world/asia/mayor-in-japan-says-comfort-women-played-a-necessary-role.html?_r=0.

¹¹ Oda, S. (1967). The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, *American Journal of International Law*, 61(3), pp. 35-56.

¹² UPI (2005, January 17). S. Korea discloses sensitive documents. *UPI*. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2005/01/17/SKorea-discloses-sensitive-documents/UPI-38131105952315/.

¹³ Asahi (2013, June 1). U.N. report criticizes Japanese politicians' remarks on 'comfort women'. *Asahi Shimbun*. Retrieved from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201306010049. Pamintuan, M. (2013, December 19). Japanese lawmakers ask for Glendole statue of 'comfort women to be taken down.



between the two countries. Inevitably, the two countries are also entangled in a territorial dispute, over the inhabited Dokdo/Takeshima rocks in the Sea of Japan.¹⁴

While an increasing confrontational dispute with China was foreseeable, and seems likely to characterise much of the security discourse in East Asia,¹⁵ a breach in diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan would have been hardly conceivable. As North Korea seems to become more and more unpredictable in its sabre-rattling exercises, endangering both countries, it would be in the strategic interest of both to return to normalised relations.¹⁶ Moreover, Japan and South Korea do share two reliable and long-standing partners, the European Union and the United States, which would be very supportive of a rapprochement. In particular, the U.S. seemed to be increasingly interested in the security situation in Asia,¹⁷ as the famed "Asia pivot" was supposed to focus its foreign policy, and military attention, more and more towards the region. While its contents and effects are still largely vague, the intention of shifting the U.S. attention to Asia did send a signal to the traditional allies, South Korea and Japan.¹⁸ As such, the U.S. has not looked favourably over their deteriorating row,¹⁹ yet it has so far failed to meaningfully intervene in mediating.

On the other hand, the EU is not so actively engaged in military or security activities in East Asia, as it has mostly focused its energies in economic negotiations. Nevertheless, after the re-shaping of its Common Security and Foreign Policy, mainly with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011, the EU is starting to embrace its security capabilities. In particular, the EU and South Korea are about to sign an agreement for the participation of South Korea in EU crisis management operations, the first agreement of this kind to be signed by an Asian country.²⁰ In this setting, the EU may find itself in the position to actively contribute to mending the relations between Japan and South Korea.

Glendale News Press. Retrieved from <http://japandailynews.com/glendale-statue-of-comfort-women-asked-to-be-taken-down-by-japanese-politicians-1941257/>.

¹⁴ Yonhap (2014, January 14). Seoul presses Japan to drop plan for Dokdo claims in textbooks. *Yonhap*. Retrieved from

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/01/14/40/0301000000AEN20140114008051315F.html>.

¹⁵ Ford, M. (2014, January 23). Will Japan Abandon Pacifism? *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/will-japan-abandon-pacifism/283298/>.

¹⁶ Smith, S.A. (2013, October 7). North Korea in Japan's Strategic Thinking. *Asian Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.theasianforum.org/north-korea-in-japans-strategic-thinking/>.

¹⁷ Colby, E. and Ratner, E. (2014, January 21). Roiling the Waters. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/21/roiling_the_waters. Stewart, P. and Alexander, D. (2014, January 23). U.S. military sees risks in China-Japan tensions, seeks restraint. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-usa-china-japan-locklear-idUSBREA0M1NA20140123>.

¹⁸ Economy, E.C.; Huxley, T.; Smith, S.A.; Fullilove, M. and Xu, B. (2013, December 20). What Happened to the Asia Pivot in 2013?. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/china/happened-asia-pivot-2013/p32108>.

¹⁹ Han Sung-Joo (2014, January 10). Power Shifts and Policy Dilemmas in Northeast Asia. *Asian Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.theasianforum.org/power-shifts-and-policy-dilemmas-in-northeast-asia-2/>.

²⁰ European Council (2014). *Council Decision on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Korea in European Union crisis management operations – adoption*, Brussels, 20 January 2014. Information about the act can be found at

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/content/out?lang=EN&typ=ENTRY&i=LD&DOC_ID=ST%2014062%202013%20REV%201.



Mediating historic wounds, a European trademark

Despite the fact that much of the European discourse has been focused on economy, one of the main reasons for the creation of the European Community was to bring peace to the continent. Indeed the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the EU as it has “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”,²¹ a testimony of the Union’s vocation to peace, and its role in mediating historical conflicts and “shows how, through well-aimed efforts and by building up mutual confidence, historical enemies can become close partners.”²² The EU has proven its ability in mediating ingrained disputes between neighbours, from its birth with the successful inclusion of West Germany in the European discourse, to the more recent conflicts in the Balkans.

With the establishment of the EEAS, the EU has been empowered with the means, structures and connections to position itself as a fundamental actor in the international community. In particular, the increasing presence of the EU in the area of international security, from the EU Mission ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia to the mediation for the Egyptian crisis, has proven its intentions and abilities. In particular, the ATALANTA mission has proven the outstanding features of the EU. While providing security to the Gulf of Aden, it has successfully coordinated the effort of extra-European multi-national forces (unsurprisingly including Japan’s and South Korea’s), while upholding the highest standards in terms of human rights and development. The EU has been given a position of leadership by both the other deployed States and the United Nations, highlighting its capabilities both in security operations and coordination. Moreover, as the most important feature, the EU has proven to be neutral towards both the Somali and international forces, establishing itself as a warden of human rights and a steadfast partner in accomplishing the various objectives of the mission.

As a consequence, the EU appears to be in the position of being able to mediate between Japan and South Korea. Moreover, it would be able to rely on the support of the U.S., one of the largest partners of both countries in military and economic terms. The EU engagement would be multi-faceted, and the Union would be able to deploy its full array of negotiation tools in such situation. First, the Union can appeal to both countries, thanks to the well established diplomatic channels. The EU shares deep links with both, and as such has the capability of reaching to the various levels of government. Second, it has the necessary degree of neutrality towards the standing disputes, paired with a clear interest in a rapprochement, to position itself as a credible mediator. Last, the possibility of coordinating its efforts with its member States, and their diplomatic channels, would give the EU the capacity to put sufficient pressure on South Korea and Japan.

In more practical terms, the EU may also provide its capabilities in terms of media and public diplomacy. As the dispute between the two countries has mostly been fuelled by excesses in the public sphere, it would be advisable to concentrate resources on a “counter-offensive” through media channels, highlighting the connections and values shared by Japan and South Korea, rather than their historic controversies. Moreover, the EU would be able to provide a larger audience and platform for a possible mediation, thus creating international support, and possibly positive pressure on both governments.

²¹ Norwegian Nobel Committee (2012). *The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012*. Oslo, 12 October 2012. Retrieved from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html.

²² *Ibid.*



On the security side, the EU has already strengthened its relations with South Korea, and it would certainly be interested to do the same with Japan – as much as Japan would be interested to advance its cooperation with South Korea²³ – and such option would be an important step towards an improvement in their relations. Once again, the U.S. would prove to be a fundamental party in bringing the two countries together, as its security interests in the region are directly connected to the well-being of the Japan-South Korea relation.²⁴

It is the political situation in both the EU and the U.S. that may create more practical impediments. As both are set to hold elections – and the EU will also sustain substantial changes to its leadership in the Commission, Council and EEAS – it may be that their energy and resources will be focused inwards. As the U.S. government will face the likely possibility of a Republican Congress with a Democratic White House,²⁵ the EU leadership will be strongly challenged by the various Eurosceptic parties.²⁶ In both cases, the international activities of the EU and the U.S. may be effectively hamstrung. Nevertheless, such risk has become an accounted variable in the EU and U.S. political landscape, and should therefore not limit their engagement with international partners, even more so in the case of Japan and South Korea.

Conclusion

Despite the internal and external challenges outlined above, the EU appears to be the most viable partner for a rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. Its capacity to mediate its own historical conflicts, while maintaining the highest standards in human rights, international engagement and development, make the Union a unique international actor. The EU would have the possibility to wield its political weight in bringing the two nations to the table, while maintaining the necessary impartiality. In other words, on one hand the Union is a regional organisation composed by many of the largest partners of Japan and South Korea, but it also stands on its own, acting in representation of the whole region. As such, it has the possibility of using its economic and political power to assert a primary role in negotiating, while maintaining a certain distance from the interests of its single member States. Moreover, the Union's institutional design, through the Commission's executive configuration and the EEAS's diplomatic connections, allows its representatives the possibility of engaging at all levels with the governments of Japan and South Korea. In other words, the EU can initiate a negotiation wielding the features of both a State and a regional organisation, thus making it an extremely reliable and desirable partner for a rapprochement.

The U.S. would also be very supportive of a EU intervention in the stalemate between Japan and South Korea, in particular given its forthcoming restructuring of its military, as

²³ Ministry of Defense of Japan (2013). *National Defense Program Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2014 and Beyond*. Tokyo, 17 December 2013. Retrieved from

http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.

²⁴ "Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement." *Ibid*.

²⁵ Hulse, C. (2014, January 26). 2014 Elections Likely to Keep Capital's Split. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/us/politics/2014-elections-likely-to-keep-capitals-split.html?hpw&rref=us>.

²⁶ Euractiv (2013, December 6). Eurosceptic tug-of-war expected in next EU Parliament. *Euractiv*. Retrieved from <http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections-2014/eurosceptics-compete-efd-groups-news-532158>.



the Quadrennial Defense Review is scheduled for 2014. Moreover, the U.S. military presence in the region relies heavily on the bases in Japan and South Korea, and has often brought the three countries together for military exercises. Lastly, the looming menace of North Korea is an everlasting concern to all three. More so as the North's regime unpredictability seems to have become a permanent feature. Rather than being entangled in internal disputes, a more cohesive Japan-South Korea front, supported by the U.S., would create a far more credible deterrence to North Korea's intemperance. The scheduled meeting between the EU leadership and President Obama in March,²⁷ may just create the perfect environment for the conclusion of contrasts between the two most reliable partners for Europe and America in East Asia.

²⁷ Pecquet, J. (2014, January 21). Obama to meet Pope Francis at Vatican. *The Hill*. Retrieved from <http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/europe/195941-obama-to-meet-pope-francis-at-the-vatican>.



Reference

Asahi (2013, November 8). Senior diplomats from Japan, S. Korea, China fail to break the ice. *Asahi Shimbun*. Retrieved from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201311080094.

Asahi (2013, June 1). U.N. report criticizes Japanese politicians' remarks on 'comfort women'. *Asahi Shimbun*. Retrieved from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201306010049.

Colby, E. and Ratner, E. (2014, January 21). Roiling the Waters. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/21/roiling_the_waters. Stewart, P. and Alexander, D. (2014, January 23). U.S. military sees risks in China-Japan tensions, seeks restraint. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-usa-china-japan-locklear-idUSBREA0M1NA20140123>.

Cossa, R.A., (2012, July). Japan-South Korea Relations: Time to Open Both Eyes. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/japan-south-korea-relations-time-open-both-eyes/p28736>.

Economy, E.C.; Huxley, T.; Smith, S.A.; Fullilove, M. and Xu, B. (2013, December 20). What Happened to the Asia Pivot in 2013?. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/china/happened-asia-pivot-2013/p32108>.

Euractiv (2013, December 6). Eurosceptic tug-of-war expected in next EU Parliament. *Euractiv*. Retrieved from <http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections-2014/eurosceptics-compete-efd-groups-news-532158>.

European Council (2014). Council Decision on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Korea in European Union crisis management operations – adoption, Brussels, 20 January 2014. Information about the act can be found at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/content/out?lang=EN&typ=ENTRY&i=LD&DOC_ID=ST%2014062%202013%20REV%201.

Ford, M. (2014, January 23). Will Japan Abandon Pacifism? *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/will-japan-abandon-pacifism/283298/>.

Han Sung-Joo (2014, January 10). Power Shifts and Policy Dilemmas in Northeast Asia. *Asan Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.theasanforum.org/power-shifts-and-policy-dilemmas-in-northeast-asia-2/>.

Harner, S. (2013, March 2). The Abe/Aso Government "Three Arrows" Agenda for Economic Revival. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2013/02/03/the-abeaso-government-three-arrows-agenda-for-economic-revival/>



Hulse, C. (2014, January 26). 2014 Elections Likely to Keep Capital's Split. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/us/politics/2014-elections-likely-to-keep-capitals-split.html?hpw&rref=us>.

Kyodo/AFP (2014, January 20). Korean who assassinated Japan's first leader honored in China. *Kyodo/AFP*. Retrieved from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/20/national/korean-who-assassinated-japans-first-leader-honored-in-china/#.Ut01nRA1jDc>.

Liu Xiaoming (2014, January 1). China and Britain won the war together. *Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/10546442/Liu-Xiaoming-China-and-Britain-won-the-war-together.html>.

Ministry of Defense of Japan (2013). National Defense Program Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2014 and Beyond. Tokyo, 17 December 2013. Retrieved from http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.

Norwegian Nobel Committee (2012). The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012. Oslo, 12 October 2012. Retrieved from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html.

Oda, S. (1967). The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, *American Journal of International Law*, 61(3), pp. 35-56.

Pamintuan, M. (2013, December 19). Japanese lawmakers ask for Glendale statue of 'comfort women to be taken down. *Glendale News Press*. Retrieved from <http://japandailynews.com/glendale-statue-of-comfort-women-asked-to-be-taken-down-by-japanese-politicians-1941257/>.

Pecquet, J. (2014, January 21). Obama to meet Pope Francis at Vatican. *The Hill*. Retrieved from <http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/europe/195941-obama-to-meet-pope-francis-at-the-vatican>.

Rochan, M. (2013, July 30). Korean Court Orders Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy To Compensate Victims of Colonial Forced Labour. *International Business Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mitsubishi-heavy-industries-nippon-steel-busan-high-495537>.

Smith, S.A. (2013, October 7). North Korea in Japan's Strategic Thinking. *Asan Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.theasanforum.org/north-korea-in-japans-strategic-thinking/>.

Stiglitz, J.E. (2013, April 4). The Promise of Abenomics. *CFO Insight*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfo-insight.com/markets-economy/global-economy/the-promise-of-abenomics/>.

Tabuchi, H. (2013, May 13). Women Forced Into WWII Brothels Served Necessary Role, Osaka Mayor Says. *New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/world/asia/mayor-in-japan-says-comfort-women-played-a-necessary-role.html?_r=0.



Takenaka, K. (2014, January 23). Abe sees World War One echoes in Japan-China tensions. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-japan-china-idUSBREA0M08G20140123>.

UPI (2005, January 17). S. Korea discloses sensitive documents. *UPI*. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2005/01/17/SKorea-discloses-sensitive-documents/UPI-38131105952315/.

Yonhap (2014, January 14). Seoul presses Japan to drop plan for Dokdo claims in textbooks. *Yonhap*. Retrieved from <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/01/14/40/0301000000AEN20140114008051315F.html>.

