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**Pakistan at Fifty-Five:
From Jinnah to Musharraf**

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Abstract

Contrary – or rather in parallel – to the current focus of discourse on Pakistan, which appears to prioritise security issues in South Asia, this paper attempts to a look at the enigmatic country from within and to present its peculiar behaviour through a hindsight reflection, which may then feed some foresight speculations. The survey revolves around three main trends cutting across the history of independent Pakistan, namely: the fundamental role of Islam, the omnipresent military and the high levels of poverty closely related to the cost of national security. Arguably, these three layers render Pakistan what it is today, fifty-five years after Jinnah addressed Pakistanis as their first Governor-General: a troubled nation, an impoverished Third World country and, most worryingly, a nuclear power under military rule. At the end of the essay, some questions will be posed as to what kind of state Pakistan should be seen as, and whether its post-independence history could have taken a different path.

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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of September 11th and the anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan, and in the midst of a ferocious confrontation with India over Kashmir, Pakistan has been one of the most talked-about states on the planet. More than half a century after it emerged from former British India, Pakistan is causing numerous questions posed in unique anxiety, such as: *Will the repercussions of the war in Afghanistan and the tension over Kashmir further fuel a wave of religious fanaticism? Will Musharraf hold on to the pressure of radical Islamists? Will the current political order survive or is yet another coup in the making? Will democracy ever take root in this country dominated by the military for the most part of its existence as an independent state?* To address these questions one needs to look into the nature of Pakistan as a state. Fifty-five years after its creation, Pakistan is still a new-born nation, but old enough for some hindsight reflection on its turbulent history.

After a brief look at the pre-partition period and the factors that led to the creation of India and Pakistan as two separate states, the paper will present the main political developments in the history of independent Pakistan. It will be argued that the failure of the civilian political élite during the ‘idealistic’ period 1947-1958 opened the door for the military to step in, which stayed in power till the restoration of democracy in the 1970s, but also paved the way for the 1971 split of Pakistan. Then Zia’s years (1977-1988) may be seen as a turning point in Pakistan’s history, with an amalgam of Islamisation and militarism standing out as the most prominent and intractable problem haunting the country even today. The second restoration of civilian rule ushered in a row of governments between 1988 and 1999, but mostly at the expense of public confidence in democracy, thus leading to yet another coup by Pakistan’s current leader, General Pervez Musharraf.

While such a chronological review looks plausible, it may well underestimate the import of three long-term trends marking Pakistan’s history as an independent state. It will be stressed that, first of all, Pakistan emerged as a religion-state – rather than a classical nation-state – with Islam acting as a fundamental constituent component of the new entity. Next, the lack of ethnic cohesion, in conjunction with the ambience of fear for next-door India, ‘invited’ the armed forces to assume a leading role in government in a manifestation of the second main trend, the

militarisation of the state. That, however, neither prevented Pakistan from splitting nor facilitated the badly needed social development of the country, thus sinking the population in unfathomable poverty. More than half a century after it emerged on the world map, Pakistan's record is hardly comforting – a troubled nation, an impoverished country, and a nuclear power under military rule. The first chapter, which provides an overview of the country's creation and years of independence, will be hence followed by three which look more closely into the underlying layers of Islamisation, militarism and poverty. Arguably, these three layers render Pakistan what it is today, fifty-five years after Jinnah addressed Pakistanis as the country's first Governor-General and the 'father of the nation'.

Finally, an attempt will be made to answer some questions as to the way things developed – or could have developed – in the country's post-independence history, the kind of state Pakistan should be seen as, and where it might be heading into the 21st century.

1. FIFTY-FIVE TURBULENT YEARS

*'... make up your mind definitely and then think of devices...
Come forward as servants of Islam ... and I am sure that you will be a power
that will be accepted by everybody.'*

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Lahore Session of Muslim League, March 1940¹

The Years of Innocence (1947-1958)

Despite the enthusiasm in both India and Pakistan on Independence Day (15 August 1947), no one expected an easy split of British India. Things had been extremely tense before 1947, and in the years leading up to Independence in 1947, tensions and clashes continued during the shift of Hindu and Muslim populations over the new border². Moreover, in October 1947 the Kashmir *maharaja* Hari Singh decided to join India, despite the fact that the majority of his subjects were Muslims. The new states quickly got engaged in a military conflict in 1947-48, which was only the first of a long row of clashes to come in the future. Jinnah's death in September 1948 deprived Pakistan of more than just its founding father. The new nation lost its most charismatic leader who could have enhanced common sense and stability in the country. Khawaja Nazimuddin took over as the second Governor-General of Pakistan, six months before the historic Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) adopted the 'Objectives Resolution' on 12 March 1949 as a set of guiding principles for the future constitution. The same year saw a cease-fire agreed upon by India and Pakistan, and a temporary demarcation line partitioning the disputed state of Kashmir. The new nation was seemingly making its first steps on the road to statehood.

The 'Objectives Resolution' (the full text is provided in Annex I) proclaimed that the state of Pakistan would be different from European pattern, but on the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam. According to this 'Magna Carta' in the country's constitutional history, sovereignty derived from – or was entrusted to Pakistan by – Allah (Objective 1)

¹ The full text of speeches during the Lahore Session of the Muslim League are available on the Internet website: http://www.geocities.com/august14_47/march40-2.html.

² At least 5 million refugees fled each way across the border between West Pakistan and India, whereas in Bengal half a million Hindus migrated from their homes, matched by an equal number of Muslims, Tammita-Delgoda, Sinharaja, *History of India*, Gloucestershire: The Windrush Press, 1994, p. 199. Figures provided by Pakistani sources are considerably higher: 7.5 million Muslim refugees reportedly

which clearly attached constituent importance to Islam. The democratic nature of the new state (Objectives 2 and 3) was also set forth in the light of Islam, even though Objective 5 provided for religious and cultural tolerance, meant to accommodate the ethnic and cultural diversity of the emergent nation.

However, what followed in the next several years displayed the strong undercurrents of confrontation and violence in the social and political life of the country. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October 1951³, which marked the beginning of the almost permanent political instability in post-independence Pakistan (for an overview, see Main Political List of Events, Annex II). The following months and years saw frequent changes in leadership and even a state of emergency proclaimed in 1954 by Malik Ghulam Muhammad, ensuing the temporary dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Two years later, in February 1956, Pakistan acquired its full-fledged constitution, but that was quickly brushed aside by the army, as the then President Iskander Mirza imposed martial law in October 1958 and thus ushered in the first military regime in the history of the new state. Pakistan's *Years of Innocence* ended infamously, but not abruptly and certainly not unexpectedly.

The Military Steps In (1958-1971)

Shortly after the abrogation of the constitutional order, power was delegated by Mirza to General Ayub Khan, who was quick to cement his position by holding a 'referendum' in February 1960, as a result of which he was elected President for five years and was given the mandate to select a new constitution for Pakistan, eventually adopted by the National Assembly in 1962. The new framework provided for a federal Islamic republic with two provinces (East and West Pakistan) and two official languages (Bengali and Urdu); the new city of Islamabad became the seat of the government, instead of the post-1959 interim capital of Rawalpindi, and Dhaka (in East Pakistan), became the legislative capital.

Eighteen years after the Indo-Pakistan hostilities that marked the partition, September 1965 saw another full-scale war, even if a short one, over Kashmir. In 1966 President Ayub Khan and India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri reached

fled to both parts of Pakistan from India, and 10 million Hindus left Pakistan for India, http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/section/pakistan_history.asp.

an accord in Tashkent at a meeting sponsored by the USSR, but in the wake of a second consecutive defeat from India the repercussions in Pakistan's domestic politics led to the walk-out of Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from the cabinet and the emergence of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in 1967. Ayub Khan stepped down in March 1969, handing over to the head of the armed forces General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, who was quick to declare martial law. For all that, the political crisis opened the way for the December 1970 first-ever direct universal voting elections in the country.

Perhaps, ironically, this election led to what can be seen as the worst shock in the history of independent Pakistan – its split. The Awami League of East Pakistan was denied a clear victory by Islamabad, which resulted in an outbreak of violence and the intervention of the federal army. The civil disobedience movement in East Pakistan quickly developed into a war of liberation which was eventually backed by India. As a result, Pakistani forces had to surrender to the Indian Army, and more than 90,000 military personnel were taken as prisoners of war. After the proclamation of Bangladesh as an independent state, a new, smaller and humiliated Pakistan emerged on 16 December 1971.

Democracy Restored? (1971-1977)

The secession of East Pakistan and the resignation of Yahya Khan left Zulfikar Ali Bhutto a civilian martial law administrator (CMLA) of the remaining territory and President of the country. In all fairness, civilian rule was not really restored, as the country continued to be largely governed in the spirit of the previous military regime.⁴ The 1973 constitution did provide for a parliamentary system, but also marked the beginning of a conspicuous wave of 'Islamisation' of the country.

Furthermore, the military strand of Pakistan's fundamental state policies clearly remained very strong even at the time of Bhutto's civilian government, as proven by yet another coup in 1977 by General Zia-ul-Haq. In retrospect, the restored civilian rule was both short-lived and marked by what could be seen as a step along

³ According to official Pakistani sources, the circumstances of his death have never been fully explained, http://www.pakistandirectory.co.uk/See_Pakistan/Liaqat_Ali_Khan/liaqat_ali_khan.html.

⁴ According to some analysts, 'Equipped with all the executive and legislative powers, [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto became a civilian dictator under the facade of a democratic government. His rule as the all-powerful Prime Minister from 1973 to 1977 was more undemocratic, more oppressive and more intolerable than the two martial law regimes, which preceded his government', Abdus Sattar Ghazali, *Islamic Pakistan: Illusions and Reality*, http://www.ghazali.net/book1/chapter_7.htm.

the lines of further turning Pakistan into a classical Islamic state, though not exactly of the post-1979 Iran type.

Zia's Regime (1977-1988)

The Chief of Army Staff, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, suspended the 1973 Constitution, but had a provisional one adopted as well as a substantial amendment, which buttressed the role of the military establishment. Meanwhile, he got rid of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by having him sentenced to death, upon a politically motivated trial, and eventually Bhutto was executed in April 1979. Under Zia, Pakistan saw an even sharper turn to Islamisation, one which had a profound impact on the state and the entire society. In terms of foreign policy, Zia's 11-year rule was marked by Pakistan's close links with the Mujahideen fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan, at the height of the Cold War.

Pakistan's military involvement – even if an indirect one – in the confrontation with the USSR in Afghanistan allowed Zia to receive substantial political and financial backing from the US, but at a rather high cost, as it turned out later on. The 'war against the infidels' translated into a considerable shift of Afghans across the border into Pakistan, resulting in both exacerbated social problems and the further radicalisation of Islamic groups in the country.

The regime collapsed suddenly in August 1988, when Zia was killed in an air crash and that gave the green-light to the restoration of democracy later that year, with the advent of Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, to premiership. Democracy was given one more chance in Pakistan, with two main players dominating the domestic scene, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and Nawaz Sharif's Muslim National League. However, the big question for Pakistan was whether the country was ready to move to a real and meaningful democracy, which would lead to prosperity at home and security in the turbulent regions of South and Central Asia.

Democracy Discredited (1988-1999)

During the so-called 'democratic interregnum'⁵, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif came to power twice each, amidst constant bickering and accusations of

⁵ Official Pakistani sources, such as e.g. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm>.

corruption.⁶ In 1990, Sharif succeeded Ms Bhutto, who was re-elected in 1993, but then her government was once again dismissed by the President three years later, and Sharif resumed the position of Prime Minister. Sharif took the risk of moving against the military establishment, by pushing through an amendment of the constitution depriving the all-powerful President of the right to dissolve the National Assembly at his personal discretion. That was regarded by the leadership of the armed forces as an attack on the military's core interests and brought Sharif closer to his political end, as proven shortly afterwards.

The intractable competition between India and Pakistan, culminating in the May 1998 nuclear tests in both countries, led to yet another explosive situation in the relations of the two neighbours. Despite the Lahore Declaration signed by Sharif and India's Vajpayee in 1999, only a few months later incursions of Islamabad-backed Muslim extremists into Kashmir developed into a full-fledged military conflict, whereby Pakistan was defeated and humiliated once more. Accusations between the political leadership and the military establishment about the causes of the Kargil debacle led to an acute political crisis which could only be solved by the 'beheadal' of one side by the other. In October 1999, Prime Minister Sharif attempted to oust General Pervez Musharraf who, however, managed to take control of the situation through a bloodless coup. Once again, at the end of this period of democratic rule it turned out that civilian governments in Pakistan were too weak to oppose the military establishment. Worse still, the general impression is that the Bhutto-Sharif years inflicted a grave blow to the credibility of any dynamism that parliamentary democracy could have in the country.

Enter Musharraf (1999-2002)

As to be expected, the constitution was suspended at once and the National Assembly was replaced by a National Security Council. General Musharraf made a pledge that free elections would be held in three years time (by October 2002), while taking over the position of President in June 2001. It would be intriguing to speculate about what ruses he might have had in mind in order to keep power beyond October 2002, if the attack on the US had not taken place on 11 September 2001.

⁶ For instance, Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Zardani were accused in 1998 by Nawaz Sharif's government of taking illegal commissions from a Swiss agency (Société Général de Surveillance)

Musharraf's impressive move to relinquish the Taliban in Afghanistan, who had enjoyed Islamabad political support after 1996, rapidly increased his international prestige and led to his *de facto* recognition as Pakistan's President. However, amidst the 'Strike on Terror' campaign in Afghanistan, Indo-Pakistani relations were inflammable enough for a new round of violence, and only the spark was needed. This spark came in the form of a terrorist attack on India's federal parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001. In a way, December 13th is for Indians what September 11th is for Americans – a huge shock, a day of grievance and a source of wide-felt outrage and indignation. India was quick to capitalise on the events and to put the blame on radical Islamists, allegedly backed by Islamabad. Pakistan refuted all the accusations, but it is a fact that over the subsequent months the Musharraf regime has been striving conspicuously to change the country's image from a religious extremist state to a liberal Islamic country, through desperate measures taken up by the government in an effort to liberalise the society⁷.

Much has been and is being written about Indo-Pakistani relations as well as about 'hard' security topics in Central and South Asia, Pakistan from within has been less attractive in terms of academic discourse. However, an understanding of the country can only be rooted in a solid grasp of its internal dynamic and a closer look, therefore, into the nature of Pakistan as a state and society. To this we turn into the next section.

appointed by the Bhutto government in 1994. The Supreme Court has granted bail to Benazir Bhutto, but has not overturned the verdict of guilt, "Not safe yet", *The Economist*, 14 April 2001.

⁷ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, 'Can Pakistan Turn Around', *Asian Affairs*, No. 17, 2002, p. 61.

2. A NATION-STATE OR A RELIGION-STATE?

*“... if they repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then they are your brothers in religion,
and We distinguish the signs for a people who know.”*

Holy Quran, Repentance, 11

“Of those We created are a nation who guide by the truth, and by it act with justice”

Holy Quran, The Battlements, 180

“Prosperous are the believers ...

“Those are the inheritors who shall inherit Paradise therein dwelling forever.”

Holy Quran, The Believers, 5-10⁸

This chapter could have begun quite differently, with a quote from one of Jinnah’s numerous and extraordinarily eloquent speeches on why Pakistan should be a separate state: ‘We are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law, we are a nation.’⁹ However, while short-term political expediency has its own rules, history may have a different opinion. A possible explanation put forward is that the fear of a permanent minority status within a federal scheme for India, which meant three Hindus to one Muslim, made Jinnah shun the logic of numbers and claim that Muslims are a ‘nation by any definition’.¹⁰

A Rather Awkward Nation-State

No doubt, the partition of former British India and the ferocious confrontation between India and Pakistan has, among other examples, provided an argument for

⁸ Arther J. Alberry, *The Koran Interpreted*, London: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp.180, 165, 343.

⁹ The speeches delivered by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah are one of the most popular topics on the Internet, e.g. <http://www.cybercity-online.net/quaid.htm#Demand%20for%20Pakistan>.

¹⁰ For an exhaustive review of the ‘Pakistan project’ in terms of identities both in pre-partition and post-independence times, see Mohammad Waseem, “Politics of Identity in Pakistan: Patterns of National and Ethnic Discourse”, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1998/waseem.pdf>.

Samuel Huntington's theory of the 'clash of civilisations'.¹¹ Ironically, had Huntington and Jinnah been contemporaries, the former's highly controversial article would probably have been admired by the latter, judging from an excerpt from Jinnah's address on the occasion of the Pakistan Resolution in Lahore (1940): 'Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.'¹² However, while it is clear why cultural differences had to be stressed in the debate on partition, both Hindus and Muslims of British India belong to the same multi-ethnic and multilingual civilisation that thrived in the former colony up to 1947. Most ironically, the Indus river that gave its name to India is now in Pakistan. More importantly and apart from this 'irony of geography', linguistic kinship between Indian Hindus and Muslims is a case in point. The day-to-day language, often referred to by the all-encompassing term 'Hindustani', used to be a widespread Indian *lingua franca* not associated with any particular region or class, and was chosen as the basis for modern Hindi, the national language of India. Modern Hindi is essentially Hindustani with a lexicon of Sanskrit-derived vocabulary in preference to the Persian borrowings of literary Urdu.

In turn, Hindustani in its Urdu form and with the use of the *nastaliq* script¹³ was adopted by Pakistan as a national language, because Urdu is not tied to any of the regions comprising modern Pakistan¹⁴. The introduction of Urdu on a national scale was a slow process – for instance, it was declared the official language of the province of Baluchistan as late as 1972¹⁵, and local leaders accepted it only because they did not want to be considered secessionists.¹⁶ It was at the time of General Zia-ul-Haq's rule (1977-88) that the intensive use of Urdu was promoted as a symbol of integration – heads of institutions were asked to speak Urdu, technical terms in the language were

¹¹ Samuel Huntington enumerates seven or eight major civilisations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African, "Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 25.

¹² Jinnah's address can be found at <http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A043&Pg=2>.

¹³ *Nastaliq* is a type of Arabic calligraphy, deriving from an elegant cursive script. The Urdu version of *nastaliq* has been influenced by the superimposition of the Persian language on the Arabic alphabet, <http://www.speakeasy.org/~nastaliq/Name.html>.

¹⁴ Afroz Taj, Introduction to *Urdu Through Hindi: Nastaliq With the Help of Devanagari*, New Delhi: Rangmahal Press, 1997, at <http://sasw.chass.ncsu.edu/fl/faculty/taj/hindi/abturdu.htm>.

¹⁵ Selig Harrison, *In the Shadow of Afghanistan: Balochi Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, New York & Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981, pp. 52-61.

disseminated and Urdu typing was officially encouraged.¹⁷ Also, it should be noted that even Quaid-i-Azam (the Father of the Nation) Muhammed Ali Jinnah would not speak in Urdu before independence.¹⁸ That should not come as a surprise - although the official language of Pakistan is Urdu, it is spoken as a first language by no more than 9% of the population; 65% speak Punjabi, 11% Sindhi, and 24% speak other languages (Pushto, Saraiki, Baluchi, Brahvi, etc.); Baluchistan alone is marked by the use of five different languages.¹⁹ English is common among the upper classes and in the government²⁰, but then Urdu tends to be the official language when Pakistan's presidents address the population of the country on important matters requiring public acceptance and national unity.²¹

The linguistic diversity clearly reflects Pakistan's mixture of many ethnic groups, a result of the occupation of the region in the past by various tribes and peoples passing through on their way to India. Even today, after more than half a century of nation-building, the ethnic patchwork of Pakistan is quite diverse. Punjabis, residing mainly in the northeast, account for 55-56% of the total, Sindhis in the southeast for 17-20%, Pathans (Pashtuns) for 10-16%, Baluchis for 3-5% and Mohajirs (Mujahirs) for up to 10%, without counting the tribes in the extreme north of the country.²²

¹⁶ Tariq Rahman, "The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Spring 1996, p. 81.

¹⁷ Inamul Haq Qausar, *Historical Documents About Urdu in Balochistan* (in Urdu), Islamabad: Muqtadra Qaumi Zaban, 1986, pp. 15-16, as quoted by Tariq Rahman, "The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan", *op. cit.*, p. 83.

¹⁸ Sinharaja Tammita-Delgoda, *op. cit.*, p. 196. Up to 1947, Jinnah could hardly speak Urdu, much worse than Gujarati which would be the language of his family. After partition, however, he did deliver some of his public speeches in the official language of independent Pakistan, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1820/18201030.htm>.

¹⁹ For an educated presentation of Baluchistan's linguistic mix, see Tariq Rahman, "The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan", *op. cit.*, p. 72.

²⁰ As admitted by official Pakistani sources, e.g. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm>. Also, it has been pointed out that English is the elitist 'salariat' language of Pakistan, which used Urdu only as a symbol of Pakistani identity and part of the ideological baggage it carried, Tariq Rahman, "The Language of Employment: The Case of Pakistan", *op. cit.*, pp. 212 and 218.

²¹ Indicative are Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's address on national TV after the nuclear tests in May 1998 as well as Musharraf's speech to the nation in September 2001 on the highly controversial 'unstinted co-operation with the US in its war against terrorism', Ahmad Faruqi, "Pakistan in the Eye of the Cyclone", *Asian Affairs*, No. 16, 2001, p. 68.

Centrifugal Forces

The ethnic diversity of the country and inter-ethnic confrontation have led to a number of separatist claims and even revolts. One of the underlying causes of separatism in post-independence Pakistan is the way the increasingly Punjab-based establishment is looked upon by the rest of the population, but also by the dominance of the so-called 'migratory élite' originating from regions in today's India. This class would include Jinnah (from Bombay) and Liaquat (from Uttar Pradesh), along with two-thirds of the higher bureaucracy and seven out of the twelve top industrial houses set up in post-independence Pakistan from non-Pakistan areas²³. It has been pointed out that no efforts have been made to minimise the grievances of the smaller provinces against the biggest one, Punjab, as a result of which the domination of the Punjabis is particularly resented by other ethnic groups in the country²⁴. But tension has arisen at provincial level as well, due to the massive migration after 1947 - for instance, Sindhis in Karachi complain that they became a minority in their own province because of the influx of migrants from India.

A closer look at these centrifugal forces will be illuminating. The Pashtuns of the northwest are a large, indigenous group that has long resisted advances by invaders and has at times sought to call their province Pakhtunkhwa²⁵, if not to establish an autonomous state within Pakistan²⁶. The riots of Sindhis and Mohajirs in January 1971 and July 1972 had similar claims, too.²⁷ Officials of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), an ethnic party accused of spreading violence in the south of

²² Jean-Luc Racine, "Au Pakistan, quel islam pour quelle nation?", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, décembre 2001, pp. 12-13, as well as Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 328.

²³ Moreover, being the principal recruitment area for the army which soon moved to the centre of the power constellation ruling Pakistan, Punjab emerged as an arch-centralist province in the newly born country, Mohammad Waseem, *ibid.*

²⁴ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, "Can Pakistan Turn Around?", *op. cit.*, p. 73. After 1971, one of the main arguments along this line has been that, being in majority in the remainder of Pakistan, the Punjabi establishment took control of the country, termed the Sindhis, Pashtuns and Mohajirs as 'traitors', and became the self-proclaimed rulers of Pakistan, as presented at <http://www.mqm.com/English-News/Apr-2000/TWO%20NATION%20THEORY.htm>.

²⁵ Tariq Rahman, "The Language of Employment: The Case of Pakistan", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Summer 2000, p. 205.

²⁶ In certain cases, however, as in Baluchistan, Pashtuns appear simply to have claimed an equal share in power in the province or to have demanded jobs, Tariq Rahman, "The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan", *op. cit.*, p. 72. Similarly, recent unrest among the Bugti employees of oil and gas companies in Baluchistan was caused by the loss of jobs, Bugti and Marri being two local agencies declared as provincially administrated tribal areas under the constitution of Pakistan – for more details, see "Government, Bugti Tribe Reach Agreement", *Pakistan Today*, 21 June 2002, Internet edition, at <http://www.paktoday.com/bugti21.htm>.

²⁷ Tariq Rahman, "The Language of Employment: The Case of Pakistan", *ibid.*

Pakistan, hold that for years Mohajirs, largely Muslims who migrated to Pakistan after partition, have been subjected to unfair treatment, such as being screened out from government departments, doors to higher education and employment opportunities through the imposition of a quota system.²⁸

Baluchis, mainly in the southwest, have also pressed for the creation of a state that would incorporate parts of Afghanistan and Iran, and what looked like an uprising in 1973 led to bloody clashes with the army.²⁹ Over the next four years, the hit-and-run skirmishes between the Pakistan army and Baluchi tribes, especially the Marris, are estimated to have claimed some 600 lives.³⁰

But even in Punjab itself, the Sikh Akali Dal ('Party of Immortals'), which was set up in 1920, led militant marches to liberate *gurdwaras*, the Sikh places of worship, from corrupt Hindu managers. Tara Singh (1885-1967), the most important leader of this vigorous Sikh political movement, first raised the demand for a separate Azad ('Free') Punjab in 1942. By March 1946, Singh demanded a Sikh nation-state, alternately called 'Sikhistan' ('Land of the Sikhs') or 'Khalistan' ('Land of the Pure').³¹

Against this ethnic and historical background, the issue of the centre-province relationship has always been one of the most intractable questions of Pakistan politics. This is a fundamental issue in the case of Pakistan – not so much because of aspirations to power, but because of the fragility of a new state marked by such a high degree of diversity and centrifugal forces. Today, Pakistan is a federal state³², but successive Pakistani regimes have pursued to sustain a state structure based on a strong centre and weak provinces. The explanation is that, although Pakistan is a federation, all its rulers hitherto have believed in and sustained a strong central

²⁸ More recently, the MQM accused the government of designating 'No Go Areas' in view of the general elections of 1997, intended to restrict the influence of the movement, <http://www.mqm.com/English-News/Apr-2000/TWO%20NATION%20THEORY.htm>. On the other hand, there are indications that regional nationalism has been used at times in the name of short-term political goals. Thus, General Zia-ul-Haq reportedly sponsored the creation of the MQM as the brainchild of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to encounter the popular Pakistan's People's Party in the southern province of Sindh. It was in the same fashion that the ISI later created other sectarian and militant groups in the country, Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, "Can Pakistan Turn Around?", *op. cit.*, p. 75.

²⁹ Jean-Luc Racine, *ibid.*

³⁰ Selig Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

³¹ For more on what is perceived as a 'genocide of the Sikhs', <http://www.khalistan.net/genocide.htm>.

³² On the basis of the 1973 Constitution, Pakistan is divided into four main provinces - Punjab, Sindh, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan - under the authority of Governors and provincial cabinets, appointed by the Chief Executive. The Northern Areas and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are administered by the federal government, but enjoy some autonomy, too. Information on Pakistan's federal structures can be found at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm>.

government - strong at the expense of provinces - as the necessary guarantee for national unity, integrity and security. They have implied and sometimes said that more autonomy to provinces would be injurious to Pakistan's integrity and unity, but in fact the question of centre-province relations has been masking the imperative for the ruling élite to keep a restive Pakistan together.³³ The problem became all the more acute after the 1971 war and the proclamation of independence by East Pakistan (Bangladesh), which brought about the collapse of the Two-Nation Theory.

East Pakistani nationalists had started challenging the authority of West Pakistan as early as 1948, when they rose in revolt and Jinnah was sent out to Dhaka to 'nip the evil in the bud'. However, four years later, Bengali students rose again and severe clashes took place in February 1952, as a result of which Bengali was accommodated, at least symbolically, as a second national language besides Urdu.³⁴

Regional nationalists in Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan have repeatedly questioned the Two-Nation Theory as well as the theory and practice of a strong centre. They claim that the events of 1971 have belied all notions of Islam being the main, let alone the only, binding force for nation-making or sustaining a state in which people have multiple ethnicities. That year saw the (not too sudden) explosion of what until then was referred to as the East Pakistan Crisis. As a result, a veritable civil war³⁵ was fought in which one set of ethnic entities in the West was pitted against the Bengalis, while both sides called themselves Muslims. According to another interpretation, the 'migratory élite' did not believe in sub-national identities and pursued to suppress them in favour of the Two-Nation Theory, but the 1971 split of Pakistan brought about the demise of Pakistan's founding concept.³⁶

³³ M.B. Naqvi, "Pakistan at the dawn of 21st century", *Defence Journal*, January 2001, Islamabad, available at: <http://www.defencejournal.com/globe/2001/jan/21stcentury.htm>.

³⁴ Tariq Rahman, "The Language of Employment: The Case of Pakistan", *op. cit.*, p. 224.

³⁵ It has been pointed out that if the massive ethnic and religious disturbances in regions like Bengal, Punjab and Kashmir had taken place in a country with fewer than 900,000,000 inhabitants, they would have merited the name of civil war, Martin Van Creveld, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-31.

³⁶ Mohammad Waseem, *ibid.* Along the – rather hard – MQM line of thought, Pakistan's founding concept ceased to exist as early as 1951, when the country's borders were shut down for the Muslims of India. It is said that, later in 1971, the Two Nation Theory again proved wrong with the separation of

The Constituent Role of Islam

It was clear as early as pre-partition times that, given the immense ethnic diversity of Pakistan and the strong centrifugal forces, the new state would urgently need a ‘common denominator’, and that was Islam. Apparently, the religious ideology as the basis of the state was viewed as a tool for nation-building and thwarting possible Indian designs to reject the creation of Pakistan. Before partition, the leaders of the future Muslim Pakistan had a strong commitment to parliamentary government and supported Jinnah in his struggle against Congress not so much because they desired an Islamic state, but because they had come to regard Congress as synonymous with Hindu domination. They had various degrees of personal commitment to Islam. To some it represented an ethic that might be the basis of personal behaviour within a modern, democratic state. To others it represented a tradition, the framework within which their forefathers had ruled India for more than three centuries before proper colonisation by the British³⁷. However, with his death in September 1948, Jinnah did not leave much behind except for his numerous speeches that were manipulated either by groups supporting a secular system or those desiring the country to be a theocratic state. One of the major questions in the 1940s was whether Pakistan were to be a secular state or a country with a strong Islamic government. It has rightly been pointed out that, while the state envisioned by Jinnah was not theocratic in nature, the issue is far from resolved³⁸.

In a speech on 11 August 1947, on the eve of independence, Jinnah set out his vision of secularism and religious tolerance in Pakistan: ‘You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or places of worship of any kind. Whatever may be your religion, creed or race, it has nothing to do with the affairs of the state.’³⁹ In another speech of his in 1948, Jinnah was even more straightforward: ‘Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims - Hindus, Christians and Parsis - but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and

the majority, i.e. Bengali Muslims, and there remained no justification for the existence of Pakistan, <http://www.mqm.com/English-News/Apr-2000/TWO%20NATION%20THEORY.htm>.

³⁷ The Moghul Empire is seen as a period of 331 years, from the enthronement of Zahiruddin Babur (Tahir-ud-Din Dabur) in 1526 to the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, when India came under the direct rule of the British Crown.

³⁸ Ayesha Siddiq-Agha, “Can Pakistan Turn Around?”, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

³⁹ Khalid Rahman, “Electoral System and Minorities”, *Dawn*, September 28, 2000.

will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.⁴⁰ Clearly then, Jinnah was opposed to the notion and the practicability of any theocratic form of government for Pakistan.⁴¹ Yet, in a carefully worded letter to one of the prominent leaders of the Ulama (higher clergy) on the issue whether Pakistan should have a constitution based on the main teachings of Islam (*shar'iat*), Jinnah was clearly walking on a tight rope:

‘It is needless to emphasize that the Constituent Assembly, which would be predominantly Muslim in its composition, would be able to enact laws for Muslims, not inconsistent with the *shar'iat* laws, and the Muslims will no longer be obliged to abide by the un-Islamic laws.’⁴²

This eloquent answer and near-prevarication would not be inconsistent, to use Jinnah’s phrasing, with his personal convictions and western education, which did not seem to match the stringent Islamic norms of conduct, as corroborated by additional evidence⁴³; instead, he was eager to see Islam as a source of cultural renaissance and social justice in the new state of Pakistan. However, Jinnah had to strike a delicate balance between secularism and theocracy. The pressure on the secular state was enormous and, at the initiative of the Ulama, a Board of Islamic Teachings was established by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) – after Jinnah had passed away - to advise the body on the Islamic pattern of the so-called Objectives Resolution, Pakistan’s first constitution. The Board took it

‘as a corollary of the Objectives Resolution that necessary provisions would be made at some proper place in the Constitution to ensure that any bill, law, ordinance or administrative order that militates against the requirements of *shar'iat* ... shall be deemed as null and void and that it would be up to the Committee of Experts on *shar'iat* to decide finally whether or not a particular law or bill or ordinance or a section thereof militates against the requirements of *shar'iat*’.⁴⁴

It could be surmised that, despite Jinnah’s reluctance, the post-independence leadership of Pakistan deliberately projected the ideological dimension due to the lack of an alternative theme or philosophy. The country had two more constitutions

⁴⁰ On a comprehensive presentation of Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan, see Abdus Sattar Ghazali, *op. cit.*, http://www.ghazali.net/book1/chapter_1.htm.

⁴¹ As confirmed once again, even after Jinnah’s death, in a speech delivered by the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in the Constituent Assembly in Karachi on 8 March 1949, Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, “The Oppositional Role of Ulama in Pakistani Politics”, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Fall 1997, p. 44

⁴² Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *ibid.*

⁴³ Salman Rushdie notes that ‘Jinnah himself ... doesn't strike me as a particularly god-bothered type. Islam and the Muslim State were for him political and cultural ideas; the theology was not the point.’, excerpts from his book *Shame*, New York: Aventura/Vintage, 1984, presented at: <http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/pakistan/literature/rushdie/islam3.html>.

adopted after the Objectives Resolution, one in 1956 and another one in 1962, with a clear reference to the role of Islam: ‘No law shall be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah’.⁴⁵ However, the Constitution of 1973, adopted during Bhutto’s civilian rule, was even more Islamic in character than the Objectives Resolution and the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions. Article 1 declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic, further on Islam was officially proclaimed as Pakistan’s state religion, it was laid down that the President had to be a Muslim above 45 years of age, and an Islamic Advisory Council was set up to recommend ways and means to bring existing laws of the country in conformity with the Islamic principles.⁴⁶

Understandably, Islam was the only major value shared by the diverse ethnic groups that made Pakistan. Although this element did not help minimise the bitterness of the inhabitants of East Pakistan (the sovereign state of Bangladesh after 1971), religion continued to be seen as a cohesive factor⁴⁷. On the other hand, and in spite of the overwhelmingly Muslim population of the country (about 97%), it would be inaccurate to assume that Muslims in Pakistan display an extremely high degree of cohesion. The co-habitation between Sunni (75%) and Shi’i Muslims in Pakistan has never been easy and was further exacerbated after 1995, when the Taliban got the upper hand in Afghanistan⁴⁸.

Another contentious political issue relating to Islam has been the so-called separate electorate system for non-Muslims in Pakistan since the 1985 elections, the thorny question being who exactly qualifies for the ‘proper Muslim’ definition. For instance, the case of the Ahmadis⁴⁹ has revealed grave doctrinal splits within the population of the country. Ahmadis in Pakistan have been refusing to participate in elections because of the separate electorate system and because they are obliged to declare that they are non-Muslims in registration forms. Other minorities too have been agitating against the separate electorate system, which has been criticised by

⁴⁴ Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley, 1963, p. 386.

⁴⁵ As reported by Abdus Sattar Ghazali, *op.cit.*, http://www.ghazali.net/book1/chapter_4.htm.

⁴⁶ The full text is available at <http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A078>.

⁴⁷ Ayesha Siddiq-Agha, “Can Pakistan Turn Around?”, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁴⁸ Jean-Luc Racine, *ibid.*

⁴⁹ The community of the Ahmadis was founded in the 14th century by Hazrat Mirza Ghulam who is considered by the majority of Pakistanis to be a claimant to prophethood, which is why Ahmadis are seen as *kafir* or non-Muslims. For more details on this controversial issue, see http://www.islamic-book-depot.org.uk/ahmadis_versus_qadianis/ahmadis.htm.

human rights and democracy activists as well.⁵⁰ They refer to the discrimination against Ahmadis, legitimised in the form of the Ahmadis Act⁵¹ promulgated by the Zia military regime that prohibits Ahmadis from using many Islamic terms and expressions. Ahmadis have been persecuted and prosecuted both under this law and the so-called Anti-Blasphemy Laws.⁵² On the other hand, it should be noted that non-Muslims have been voting for seats reserved for them under favourable conditions in terms of representation. Thus, for the 207 seats for the representatives of the 55 million Muslim, the average vote per seat is 266,029; for the 10 seats for non-Muslims, slightly more than 1.5 million, it is just 154,764.⁵³

The dispute is very heated even nowadays and certainly far from being resolved⁵⁴, despite the fact that Jinnah himself seems to have had a rather moderate view on the issue as illustrated by his statement in Kashmir in May 1944: ‘Who am I to declare a person as non-Muslim who calls himself a Muslim?’.⁵⁵ With hindsight, it would seem that, despite the constituent role of Islam in a newly created and diverse country as Pakistan, it was not the ideal ‘cement’ invoked by the country’s founders, as it never erased the ethnic and linguistic differences; indeed, this was more than convincingly illustrated by the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. Given the deficiency of Islam as a ‘common denominator’, Pakistan had to be kept together by other means as well. This is where, in conjunction with the threat posed by the presence of next-door India, the military stepped in.

⁵⁰ See a relatively recent report by Amnesty International, “Pakistan: Killing of Ahmadis must not go unpunished”, 1 November 2000, at <http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA330132000>.

⁵¹ The Constitution (Second) Amendment Act, enforced in 1974, declared Ahmadis a non-Muslim community, Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

⁵² Under the Blasphemy Laws, adopted in Zia’s time, the punishment for ‘defiling the name of the Prophet Mohammed’ is death, ‘desecrating the Quran’ is punishable by life imprisonment, and ‘insulting another person’s religious beliefs’ calls for up to ten years in prison, Sangeeta Tomar, “Human Rights in Pakistan”, *Indian Quarterly*, Vol. LVII, No. 2, April-June 2001, p. 127.

⁵³ Khalid Rahman, *ibid.*

⁵⁴ A recent report can be found in “Ahmadis demand end to separate electorate”, *Dawn*, 25 June 2001, Internet edition: <http://www.dawn.com/2001/06/25/nat10.htm>.

⁵⁵ More on Ahmadis at <http://www.muslim.org/pakistan/qazam1.htm>

3. FROM QURAN TO SWORD

'How can you fight a nuclear submarine or an aircraft carrier with a bamboo stick?

We have to match sword with sword, tank with tank, and destroyer with destroyer.

The situation demands that national defence be bolstered and Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defence expenditure, since you cannot freeze the threat to Pakistan's security.'

General Zia-ul-Haq⁵⁶

General Zia's words could have been uttered much earlier than his presidency – in fact, as early as 1947 Pakistan got engaged in a war from the very first days of its independence and the military acquired a prominent role because of that. However, this indisputable fact should by no means be seen as legitimising the army's practice of meddling with politics.

What Brought the Military In?

The military got involved in politics even before Pakistan was constituted as a state, in the autumn of 1947. In a way, the armed forces got the credit of Pakistan's most patriotic and reliable institution, one that was revered and respected by the entire nation. From the very start, the armed forces assumed the responsibility of guarding not just the frontiers of the country, but the Islamic ideological identity as well. This is how the military assumed by definition a double function that can be compared to the doctrine of *Dwifungsi* (Dual Function) of the Indonesian army ABRI. In that case, the Indonesian military believed that its contribution to the anti-colonial revolution in the 1940s made it permanently responsible for the overall well-being of the nation and therefore entitled its officers to hold key positions in the government.

Analysts have pointed out that, after all, it was the incompetence of Pakistan's post-Jinnah political leadership that drew the armed forces heavily into politics and policy-making⁵⁷. On the other hand, the high-ranking military never really allowed for a period of grace for the political leadership and became involved in political manipulations at once. If politicians in the early days of independent Pakistan failed to live up to the requirements of statesmanship, the manipulation of the political system by the armed forces caused endless crises, too. For instance, the way the military took

⁵⁶ Prime Minister Junaio (1985-1987) was reportedly rebuffed by Zia-ul-Haq with these words, when trying to push through a reduction of defence spending, Mushahid Hussain, 'Pressure Put on Pakistan's Spending', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, X, No. 2, 16 July 1988, p. 78.

over in 1958 and the pretext used are truly revealing. In what was one of the most sensational developments at the end of the *Years of Innocence*, the rebellious Khan of Kalat⁵⁸ was arrested in October 1958 on the charge of gathering some 80,000 tribesmen to ‘revolt against the Government’. The Khan denied these accusations and many people, including some Pakistan officials, have later held that President Iskander Mirza had encouraged the Khan to assert his autonomy to order to find a pretext to impose martial law.⁵⁹ Previously mentioned indications of how regional nationalism has been used in the name of short-term political goals (e.g. MQM by Zia) only come to corroborate this pattern of military intervention in politics.

No wonder that the political instability, the rampant corruption of the political and bureaucratic élite, and poor governance have given birth to public scepticism of the prevalent system. The unreliability of the political system has rendered the presence of the army all the more necessary and, thus, a vicious circle has taken root in Pakistan, with the military causing and ‘solving’ crises at the same time. In other words, the army has on a lot of occasions acted both as a trouble-maker and a trouble-shooter.

Patterns of Military Rule

It will be argued here that, either during military regimes or at times of civilian rule, the armed forces of Pakistan have always displayed a remarkable ability to wield power and to manipulate governments. The years between 1977 and 1988 provide one of the best examples. Although Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law in July 1977, he did not put to an end to the Constitution of 1973 altogether; rather, he would amend the constitution and adjust it to the needs of the military. The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan⁶⁰ envisaged a parliamentary system of government, with the balance of power tilted favorably towards the Prime Minister, whereas the President could not exercise his powers without the concurrence of the Prime Minister. Under the 1973 Constitution, the National Assembly could only be dissolved by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. After introducing a ‘provisional’ constitution in 1981, four years later Zia passed the 8th Amendment, which empowered the President to

⁵⁷ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, *ibid.*

⁵⁸ The Khan of Kalat had initially declared independence in August 1947, but had later acceded to Pakistan in March 1948, Tariq Rahman, “The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan”, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁵⁹ Tariq Rahman, “The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan”, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁶⁰ Presented at <http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A078>.

dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2b) and this had profound implications on the constitutional and political history of the country thereafter.

Under the 8th Amendment, the President was given the right to nominate the Prime Minister, governors of the provinces, judges of the High and Supreme Courts (including the Chief Justice), Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC). According to the proponents of this clause, due to the frequent political deadlocks in the country, it was necessary to vest this authority in the President, so that in case of a political crisis the Assembly could be dissolved, new elections could be held and a Martial Law could be avoided. However, this could not conceal the fact that after the 8th Amendment all the democratically elected politicians and other public officials became subservient to the self-appointed President.

The Article 58(2b) changed the entire complexion of the constitution, which was transformed from a parliamentary system into a presidential one. This amendment was like the proverbial sword of Damocles for a number of post-1985 governments in Pakistan. Neither the Bhutto government nor two following popular governments were allowed to complete their respective five-year constitutional terms. In fact, instability was in-built into the constitution of the country, which allowed the President to sack any political government. This Article of the Constitution was invoked five times after 1985 to remove governments and, incidentally, the charges were always similar – corruption⁶¹.

‘Armed’ with the powerful prerogative deriving from Article 58 (2b), over the last 17 years Pakistan’s presidents emerged as the most important players in the country in nearly every political aspect and left plenty of room for ambiguous and disputable options. Zia’s successors inherited his legacy and made frequent use of it. For instance, when a controversy surged between the President and the Prime Minister in 1989-90 over the appointment of Admiral Sirohey as the chairman of JCSC, it was the President's will that prevailed.⁶² In his second tenure as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif finally revoked the controversial Article 58 (2b) but, instead of giving stability to the system, annulling the Article left the military with no choice other than the

⁶¹ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, “Can Pakistan Turn Around?”, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁶² In 1989 Benazir Bhutto made an attempt to remove the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Sirohey. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan insisted that, under the Constitution, dismissing as well as appointing Generals was his prerogative. The army feared that if Ms Bhutto ‘got away’ with this act, a precedent would be set by which she would remove other superior officers, too, Abdus Sattar Ghazali, *op. cit.*, http://ghazali.net/book1/body_chapter_9.htm.

imposition of a martial law, which is exactly what General Musharraf did in October 1999. In retrospect, it could be said that by threatening the core interests of the armed forces through the adoption of 13th Amendment in April, Nawaz Sharif sealed his fate and, in a way, pushed General Pervez Musharraf to drastic action meant to safeguard the privileges of the Pakistani military establishment.

Coups have been common in Pakistan and seem to form part of the military's 'institutional memory'; in this sense, Musharraf's coup in 1999 was no exception. It has been pointed out that

'the coup was limited to safeguard[ing] personal and institutional interests. Since the reintroduction of democracy in 1985, the Army has maintained the tradition of directly or indirectly dismissing the governments whenever there was a risk to that institution's interests. The unfolding events, particularly the life sentence of the former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, indicate[d] Musharraf's determination to force that agenda on society.'⁶³

Another important component of the military machinery, often assigned the 'special mission' of organising a coup, are of course Pakistan's intelligence agencies. All the three services have their own intelligence branches, but the most influential one is the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI), whose core personnel is drawn from the army and, thus, the institution is used to serve the greater organisational interests of the armed forces. The ISI gained national prominence with its involvement in the Afghan crisis, where it was allowed to operate freely in running the operations. Since then, the ISI has been not just an important player in the military, but something of a law unto itself⁶⁴, involved in domestic politics as well.⁶⁵

But even when drastic action like coups was not deemed necessary, the armed forces had alternative options. Given the pressure the military could exert over any government, they were shrewd enough to 'relinquish' power three times – in 1969, 1971 and 1988. In 1969, Ayub Khan's resignation was submitted under the mounting pressure of massive political and economic grievances, as admitted by official government sources⁶⁶, but the move may well have been one of salvation for the

⁶³ Ayesha Siddiqi-Agha, 'Pakistan's military rule', published in the *EIAS Bulletin*, European Institute for Asian Studies, Brussels, available at http://www.eias.org/bulletins.cfm?art_id=203&bul=54. In addition, it has been pointed out that Musharraf quickly accepted all the US demands in the post-Sept. 11th weeks in an identical attempt to protect the corporate interests of the Pakistani military, Ahmad Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁶⁴ "The weakest link", *The Economist*, 1 June 2002.

⁶⁵ See K.N. Daruwalla, "Pakistan: Intelligence Agencies and Political Destiny", in Rajiv Sharma, ed., *The Pakistan Trap*, New Delhi: UBSPD, 2001.

⁶⁶ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm>.

military establishment, in the face of large-scale unrest threatening to sweep the *status quo*. According to this hindsight interpretation of the period in question, Ayub Khan was ‘ditched by his own Army which viewed him as a political liability’, while an election was held [in December 1970] as a catharsis for the bottled-up popular sentiment. In a way, the military decided to dump Ayub Khan, transferring power to elected politicians.’⁶⁷ In 1971, even after the defeat in East Pakistan, General Yahya Khan reportedly had plans to stay on, but these plans were averted after a coup from within and power was handed over to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the very next day, 20 December 1971.⁶⁸ Things must have been different in 1988 after General Zia's death, when the military establishment tried - but failed - to block the return to power of the Pakistan People's Party led by Benazir Bhutto.⁶⁹ In retrospect, it seems that upon the death of General Zia once again a free parliamentary election and the transfer of power to politicians became inevitable. A possible explanation put forward is that the Ziaist world view of an expansion of Pakistan's frontiers to the Oxus River (the border between Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia) coupled with the army's larger-than-life role that was defined as defending the country's ‘ideological frontiers’ had now become redundant.⁷⁰ In any case, ‘armed’ with the 8th Amendment till 1997, army-controlled Presidents still managed to dismiss the National Assemblies three times in the 1990s, till Sharif did away with the controversial article.

Quran Under Sword

If Islam and the military can be seen as Pakistan's most sustainable institutions, a noteworthy development has been their close interaction, in what could be called a ‘Quran-under-Sword’ arrangement. However, it was not until the 1970s that the politicians - be it civilians, be it the military establishment - started to use religion as a tool to win popularity. The slogan of ‘ideology of Pakistan’ as part of the official lexicon was coined during the second military regime of General Yahya Khan in 1970, while ‘jihad’ was formally injected in the official jargon in 1976 when after being appointed as Army Chief by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, General Zia-ul Haq gave the

⁶⁷ Mushahid Hussain, “Whither Pakistan's Establishment?”, *Pakistan Today*, Friday, June 21, 2002, Internet edition, <http://www.paktoday.com/wither.htm>. This intriguing remark of the author reveals still another striking similarity to Suharto's removal in Indonesia in 1998.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* Rumour has it that Generals Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan practically forced Yahya Khan at gun point to transfer power to Bhutto, as reported by Abdus Sattar Ghazali, *op. cit.*, http://www.ghazali.net/book1/chapter_5.htm.

⁶⁹ Mushahid Hussain, “Whither Pakistan's Establishment?”, *ibid.*

Pakistan Army its new official motto 'Faith, Piety and Jihad in the Way of Allah'.⁷¹ Starting from that time, governments seemed to be racing against each other by being more receptive to orthodox views than the previous ones. In fact, each government tended to raise the stakes even higher. For instance, the elder Bhutto prohibited alcohol and declared Friday (instead of Sunday) as the weekly public holiday in respect of the religious-cultural traditions. These measures were adopted despite the fact that he was no teetotaler and enjoyed a fairly western lifestyle; furthermore, Islamic Socialism was a slogan that he raised to win votes and popular support⁷². Later in the 1970s, General Zia-ul-Haq stepped up the 'Islamisation' of the system and society through legalisation and institutionalisation – e.g. the introduction of *shar'iat* and laws against blasphemy, the creation of Nazim-i-Salaat (a committee to ensure that the community conformed to religious rituals like five-time prayers a day), etc⁷³.

Along the same line, Zia even opted for the Referendum Order of 1984 putting forward a rather complex question to the citizens, but in essence seeking endorsement of the process of Islamisation initiated in earlier years. The answer, of course, could not be given in negative, and the affirmative vote in the referendum was to result in a five-year term for Zia as a President of Pakistan.

This particular event can be seen in another light, too. Apart from the trend of Islam being used as a 'tool of political legitimacy', the 1984 referendum is part and parcel of yet another pattern of how successfully the Pakistani military has been able to manipulate power.⁷⁴ In a strikingly similar development, General Musharraf held a referendum, in April 2002. The referendum question was phrased so as to make 'No' virtually unthinkable and, while the official result of 97.5% in favour of Musharraf is probably accurate, few analysts outside Pakistan find the government's figures of voters turn-out - more than 50% - credible at all. However, strictly speaking, the 'Musharraferendum'⁷⁵ does not legitimate the President unless he is elected by a

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ In 1971, even after the defeat in East Pakistan, General Yahya Khan reportedly had plans to stay on and was considering imposing an Islamic Constitution, Mushahid Hussain, "Whither Pakistan's Establishment?", *ibid.*

⁷² Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, "Can Pakistan Turn Around?", *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁷³ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, "Can Pakistan Turn Around?", *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁷⁴ The first military leader of Pakistan to hold a referendum legitimising his rule was Ayub Khan in February 1960.

⁷⁵ "The general's empty victory", *The Economist*, 4 May 2002.

college of Pakistan's national and local parliaments or the constitution is properly amended.

The Afghan Link

Any analysis of the 'Quran-Sword' component of independent Pakistan would be incomplete without reference to the war in Afghanistan (1979-1988), which marked - and more or less coincided with - the Zia rule. No doubt, the reasons behind Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan were of a strategic nature, relating both to the specific regional context and the general spirit of the Cold War era. With its main cities and communications arteries located close to the border with India and, thus, vulnerable to attack, Pakistan has always viewed Afghanistan as the 'strategic depth' it badly needed; furthermore, the headwaters of Pakistan's rivers and vital irrigation systems are largely controlled by India.⁷⁶ It was the same strategic consideration that prompted Pakistan to provide political support to the Taliban regime after 1996, the main official argument being that Islamabad hoped for a favourable disposition of the Taliban in matters of foreign policy, since some 13% of Pakistan's population has a Pashtun identity.⁷⁷

Secondly, Pakistan's military establishment viewed the 1979 Soviet occupation as an opportunity to claim a bigger role - and aid⁷⁸ - at the height of the Cold War; therefore, Afghanistan was too convenient a pretext to miss. Pakistan has always been regarded by the US as a dependable ally and a front-line state vis-à-vis West and Central Asia, thanks to its location next to China, Russia, Iran, India, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.⁷⁹ However, while the central theme in Washington-Islamabad negotiations was 'fight against communism', on Pakistan's domestic political scene opposing the Soviet occupation of next-door Afghanistan was presented as a 'war against the infidels', thus appealing to religious circles and further enhancing the 'Quran-Sword alliance'.

If religion was a constituent component of Pakistan and the army acted as the 'guardian' of the new state, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and Islamabad's

⁷⁶ A comprehensive analysis is available in "Pakistan: A Country Study" on the website of the US Congress [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+pk0148\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pk0148)).

⁷⁷ Ahmad Faruqui, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁷⁸ The US economic and military aid to Pakistan averaged some \$650 million a year in the 1980s, Ahmad Faruqui, *op. cit.*, p 73.

⁷⁹ Annpurna Nautiyal, "Pakistan Factor in Post-Cold War Indo-U.S. Relations", *Journal for South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXII, No. 4, Summer 1999, p. 38.

involvement in this Cold War theatre provided an impetus for the development of deeper links between religious parties/groups and the military establishment. As soon as the invasion started, Zia forged an alliance with Jamaat-i-Islami and other religious parties, 'subcontracted' to wage the war against the infidel 'communists'. To make the threat appear more realistic, General Zia opened the country's doors to the Afghan immigrants and started a programme for the formal training of both Afghan Mujahideen and Pakistan Army personnel to fight a clandestine war in Afghanistan.

This 'Quran-Sword alliance' against communism, given the tolerance of the US at the time, was assessed as highly successful by Islamabad, judging from the fact that later on Pakistani military strategists saw the partnership between state forces and non-state actors as a viable tool for winning wars on other fronts as well, such as against India in Kashmir. Cost considerations were, *inter alia*, quite relevant to this strategy. The low cost of such low-tension conflict would indeed not burden Islamabad as these activists were provided with only training and weapons. Even these expenses could be borne by the militants who would generate their own funds through donations from devout Muslims. This strategy remained unaltered in the 1980s and 1990s with 'fire simmering' in Kashmir, with Pakistan pursuing the goal of turning the disputed territory turned into a liability for India⁸⁰.

However, in the long run the 'Quran-Sword alliance' in waging wars proved a tricky one. It is clear now that Pakistan's involvement in the war in Afghanistan unleashed developments beyond and on a much larger scale than Zia's initial plan. Apart from providing a strategic depth, Afghanistan was a source of threats as well. The massive exodus of Afghan refugees at the time caused to Pakistan not just considerable financial troubles, but above all contributed to the radicalisation of large parts of the Pakistani population, particularly in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).⁸¹ Similarly, the roots of the heavily televised pro-Taliban rallies that took place recently in Pakistan, in the wake of 11th September and the US-led 'Strike

⁸⁰ Ayesha Siddiqi-Agha, "Can Pakistan Turn Around?", *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

⁸¹ Several years later, the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is reported to have stated that the presence of Afghan refugees constituted a threat to Pakistan's security, as they offered extremist training in schools and this increased the threat of Pakistan's 'Talibanisation', Ziba Farzin Nia, "Pakistan and Heightened Sanctions Against the Taliban", *Amu Darya*, Center for the Study of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Tehran, Fall 2001, Vol. 6, No. 10, pp. 367-8. For an informative report on the situation at refugee camps near Peshawar, see also Zahid Anwar, "The socio-economic and political thought-process of the Afghan refugees in and around Peshawar", *Central Asia, Special Issue on Afghanistan*, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2001.

against Terror' in Afghanistan, may well be traced back in Zia's rule⁸². Moreover, while the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies have helped create many of the groups which take part in the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir, it is far from clear that Pakistan can disband them at will⁸³. The difficulty of reigning in incursions in Kashmir and or even violence in the streets of large cities of Pakistan is primarily a function of the close links between the military and religious groups since the rule of General Zia, and a serious challenge to the 'Quran-under-Sword' arrangement.

It is only natural that the policy option of linking national security issues to Islam should increase the blackmailing power of the religious parties and considerably enhance ideological fundamentalism⁸⁴. Following September 11th, implications for Pakistan's domestic politics were practically inevitable. Musharraf's U-turn vis-à-vis Afghanistan after September 11th unleashed near-seismic forces along the faultlines of Pakistan's Islamic population; one week after the start of the bombing campaign in October 2001, 83% of Pakistanis supported the Taliban, according to a poll carried out by Gallup International⁸⁵. The TV images of street protests in Pakistan were anything but surprising. At that time, the religious circles, rather than the mainstream political parties, reflected the prevalent public opinion. For all that, Musharraf's had no other option. After 11th September 2001, the establishment's two-decade old policies of 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and 'jihad' in Kashmir were no longer sustainable, because of the new global realities, marked by the US-led 'war on terrorism'. It should be noted, however, that amidst the unrest in Pakistan since September 11th, Musharraf's 'calm-down' campaign has been fairly efficient and quite remarkable in spirit: while he has spoken of Pakistan's national interests (just like all his predecessors would have done), he has also stressed the need for the Pakistani nation to consider the country's economic plight. Perhaps another shrewd tactical move, but not irrelevant to reality.

⁸² Even before Sept. 11th and the US-UK bombing in Afghanistan, which caused another massive wave of refugees to Pakistan, many Afghans had already settled down in the country – in Islamabad alone they were one out of every six residents. According to a 2001 survey, close to 100,000 Afghan nationals lived in the capital city of Pakistan, with a total population of 600,000, Ziba Farzin Nia, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

⁸³ Owen Bennett-Jones, 'How secure is Musharraf?', 27 May, 2002, BBC World Service, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_2011000/2011257.stm

⁸⁴ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, "Can Pakistan Turn Around?", *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 75.

⁸⁵ Ahmad Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p 67.

THE 'POVERTY-FOR-SECURITY' TRADE-OFF

'In Islam, Jihad is not confined to armed struggles only.

Have we ever thought of waging Jihad against illiteracy, poverty, backwardness and hunger?

This is the larger Jihad. Pakistan, in my opinion, needs to wage Jihad against these evils.'

General Pervez Musharraf, 27 January 2002⁸⁶

Apart from sheer political manoeuvring, there are plenty of reasons why President Musharraf should consider launching a campaign against his country's poverty. According to a recent Human Development Report on South Asia, 'While less than one-third of Pakistan's people are income poor, nearly one-half suffer from serious deprivation of several opportunities of life. Nearly two-thirds of the total adult population (and as much as three-fourths of the adult female population) cannot read or write. Access to basic social services like primary health care and safe drinking water is denied to nearly half of the population. About 38% of the children under five are malnourished.'⁸⁷

Of course, Pakistan is not the only country with such a sad record – very many Asian economies and the overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan African countries are positioned high on UN poverty lists. Furthermore, after fifty-five turbulent years, three full-scale wars and a series of other military conflicts with India, the dire straits of Pakistan's economy are only to be expected. Perhaps quite understandably, a state that was pre-occupied with its security from the very first days of its existence, was defeated three times by its gigantic neighbour and even lost the majority of its population after 1971 could hardly have invested more heavily in anything else but defence. It is not unreasonable that Pakistan has always accorded priority to territorial security as compared to social and economic issues, based on the argument that it is military strength and stability that can ensure the overall security of the country. In a way, Pakistan has opted for a 'poverty-for-security' trade-off, not inconsistent with the history of and the formidable challenges in South Asia. What, however, makes a huge difference and certainly renders Pakistan (as well as India) incomparable with

⁸⁶ A speech delivered by Musharraf, as reported at <http://www.theglobalist.com/nor/gdoc/2002/01-27-02.shtml>.

⁸⁷ Mahbub-ul Haq, Khadija Haq, *Human Development in South Asia 1998*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 17.

other Third World countries is the fact that both of them have joined the 'club' of nuclear powers.

This paper will not present in detail the financial aspects of developing nuclear capabilities, which is no doubt an extremely important topic *per se*. Here we will examine the implications of Pakistan's heavy armaments on the social fabric of its population.

The Cost of Security

That the high level of defence expenditure in Pakistan has resulted in an adverse impact on Pakistan's economy cannot be called into question. According to one study, 'defence expenditure in Pakistan has a negative impact on GDP when it increases to over 6.5% of the GDP for a decade and more. During the 1978-88 decade alone, this threshold had already been crossed with defence expenditures averaging 6.8%.'⁸⁸ But even more recently, as in 1999-2000, the budget deficit amounted to Rs 183.7 billion, at 6% of the GDP as against the target of 3.5%.⁸⁹

The trend is not new. Since the time of the creation of Pakistan, 40-50% of the revenue has been spent on defence, resulting in a worrying structure of the country's budget: 55% of the revenue is spent on debt repayment, 30% on defence and 10-15% on civil and administrative costs.⁹⁰ So far, constant borrowing by one government after another has left Pakistan facing a total debt of approximately US\$38 billion.⁹¹ Initially, it was the declining development budget that was financed through debt, but with the passage of time borrowing financed the non-development budget as well. In the period 1988-2000, debt servicing overtook defence expenditure, and at the end of the 20th century, Pakistan reached a stage where it had to reschedule part of its US\$30 billion external debt only to keep afloat⁹² and the economic sanctions that followed the May 1998 nuclear tests only exacerbated the imbalance. Clearly, Pakistan is in a

⁸⁸ Jasjit Singh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posturing: Hitching its Star to India's Wagon", *The Times of India*, November 13, 1996, as cited in Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defence Expenditure", in Jasjit Singh, ed., *Asian Strategic Review 1997-98*, New Delhi: IDSA, 1998, p. 68.

⁸⁹ For further analysis, see B. Raman, "Pakistan's Fragile Economy", 15 September 2000, on the Internet site <http://www.asiafeatures.com/business/0009,1315,04.html>

⁹⁰ For more details, see Ziauddin, 'Neither Secure nor Developed', available on the Internet site <http://www.pakistanlink.com/Opinion/2000/June/16/01.html> .

⁹¹ Ahmed Rashid, "Borrowed Time", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 December 2000, p. 28.

⁹² Kamal Siddiqi, "Will a Miracle Happen", *Dawn*, Internet edition, available on the following site: <http://www.dawn.com/events/century/pla11.htm>.

position where new loans are being acquired to repay the old ones, with defence expenditure adding a heavy burden to Pakistan's economy in a spiralling manner.

Small wonder then that the present military regime of General Musharraf has been struggling to service this debt and has been on the verge of defaulting. Since the time it assumed power in October 1999, it has been negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a US\$2.5 billion three-year credit which would help the country stay afloat and maintain at least a semblance of fiscal credibility. Pakistan managed - temporarily - to avert the crisis of immediate default when the IMF approved a 10-month stand-by credit of US\$596 million in November 2000.⁹³ However, Pakistan would have to adhere to the stiff conditions imposed by the IMF in order to obtain all the tranches of the package agreed upon.⁹⁴

Given this tremendous financial burden, what are the factors pushing Pakistan to its excruciatingly high defence spending? These include the perceived security threat from India dating all the way back to 1947, coupled with the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan (1979-1988) which gave an opportunity to the leadership of the Pakistani army to fulfill its long desired modernisation plans, including the development of nuclear capabilities.

From Sword to Nuke

Pakistan's strategic environment has always been primarily conditioned by its perception of a security threat from India. From the very start, Pakistan's élite suspected that India's priority was to cripple the newly born Islamic state in its infancy;⁹⁵ moreover, after the 1971 split, the country's leadership worried that India would love to see Pakistan further dismembered.⁹⁶ While the correctness of this particular perception could be the subject-matter of a long discourse, Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and India's undisputed conventional military superiority over Pakistan were the main reasons for Pakistan's decision to turn to a nuclear option.

The initial impetus for Pakistan's nuclear development came in January 1972, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced a plan to develop nuclear arms at a meeting with

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ See Shalini Chawla, "Recent Developments in Pakistan", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, May 2001, p. 285-294.

⁹⁵ Anirudha Gupta, "Issues in South Asia: Geo-politics or Geo-economics?", *International Studies*, January-March, 1997, Vol. 94, No. 1, p. 20.

Pakistan's top scientists at Multan.⁹⁷ Cost did not seem to be a consideration, given the magnitude of the threat perception, and Bhutto is reported to have remarked that 'Pakistan will eat grass if necessary' to stay at par with Indian nuclear capability.⁹⁸ The 'nuclearisation' of Pakistan developed fast: after India's first nuclear test in 1974, Islamabad followed suit and started developing its nuclear programme, with both Chinese and western assistance.⁹⁹

This quarter-of-a-century enterprise has been retarded at times by various sanctions by the western world, but never cancelled.¹⁰⁰ 1975 saw the purchase of components and technology for the Kahuta uranium-enrichment centrifuge facility, whereas two years later vacuum pumps, equipment for uranium enrichment and high-frequency inverters for controlling centrifuge speeds were provided by West German and British companies. In 1981, a smuggler was arrested at a US airport while attempting to ship two tonnes of zirconium to Pakistan; nevertheless, the Reagan administration kept on providing generous military and financial aid because of Pakistani help to Afghan rebels battling the Soviet troops. In 1983 China reportedly supplied Pakistan with a bomb design, and three years later the two countries signed a pact on peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the design, construction and operation of reactors. Next year, Pakistan acquired a tritium purification and production facility from West Germany, and in 1989 a 27-kilowatt research reactor was built with Chinese assistance. In 1993, according to a report by the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute referred to some 14,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges installed in Pakistan, and German customs officials seized about 1,000 gas centrifuges bound for Pakistan. In 1996 Pakistan bought 5,000 ring magnets from China to be used in gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, and completed a 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor that, once operational, could provide the first source of plutonium-bearing spent fuel free from international inspections. In May 1998, under the second Nawaz Sharif government, Pakistan conducted its own

⁹⁶ "The weakest link", *The Economist*, 1 June 2002.

⁹⁷ Sumita Kumar, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon Programme", in Jasjit Singh, ed., *Nuclear India*, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998, p. 157.

⁹⁸ As reported by Shalini Chawla, "Pakistan's Military Spending: Socio-Economic Dimensions", available at <http://www.idsa-india.org>

⁹⁹ India's argument is that its nuclear option was first considered after the Indo-China war of 1962 and not because of problems with Pakistan, Annpurna Nautiyal, *op. cit.*, p. 42. Islamabad retorts that India's first test in 1974 was carried out a mere 100 miles away from the border with Pakistan and that the message of New Delhi could not have been misinterpreted, Ahmad Faruqui, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

¹⁰⁰ For a detailed review of the nuclear programme of Pakistan (as well as of India), the reader could visit the website http://www.pakalert.net/articles/nuke_cap.asp.

atomic

explosions

in reaction to India's fresh nuclear tests a few days earlier.

Authorities in New Delhi insist that, contrary to Pakistan's claims, India's nuclear programme is energy-related.¹⁰¹ They argue that the projection of India as a threat appears to be fundamental to the survival of the Islamabad establishment as it strengthens the ground for Pakistan's defence budget and further legitimises the role of the military. The truth may well be lying somewhere halfway between the two adversaries' official positions. It is a fact that for Pakistan the development of India's nuclear capabilities has necessitated a similar military build-up. At the same time, however, the nuclear programme of Islamabad has enabled the country's armed forces to meet three more political goals: i) to use the issue of nuclear deterrence to generate a national consensus and thus confirm the legitimacy of the military; ii) to promote the cause of Kashmir, over which Pakistan was defeated three times between 1947 and 1971; iii) to build up a modern army with a state-of-the-art equipment all across the board, apart from nuclear arms.

It is now indisputable that, having acquired nuclear capabilities, Pakistan has managed to arrest the world's attention and to internationalise its confrontation with India. However, here we shall focus on the structural link between Pakistan's defence expenditure and levels of poverty.

The Vicious Circle of Poverty

The negative influence of defence spending and borrowing is obvious in the form of retarded growth of the social sector in Pakistan. Pakistan's social conditions are pitiful and the state of development is deplorable. Currently, Pakistan ranks 9th among 117 market economies in terms of defence spending as a share of total expenditure, but at the same time it is among the poorest economies worldwide: e.g 17th in education and 34th in health per capita expenditure.¹⁰²

As shown in Annex III, Pakistan's security priority has been disproportionately higher than at least two important social sectors, health and education; in fact, the combined expenditure on these sectors is much less than the military spending. In a

¹⁰¹ Annpurna Nautiyal, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Furthermore, it is estimated that by 2005 some 10% of India's energy needs will be met by nuclear power, whereas currently only 0.65% of Pakistan's total energy is reported to come from nuclear resources, "India and Pakistan: Nuclear Capabilities", http://www.pakalert.net/articles/nuke_cap.asp.

¹⁰² Ziauddin, *ibid.*

striking contrast, in a recent report the Asian Development Bank has set quite different priorities for the 2002-2004 period i) sustainable, pro-poor growth, ii) inclusive social development, and iii) good governance.¹⁰³ This set of priorities is unlikely to be readily accepted by the country's military and political élite, as it touches on three core issues for the state of Pakistan: investment in social development can only be effected at the expense of defence, overcoming long-drawn ethnic and social faultlines might challenge the current balance of political power, and transparency is clearly incompatible with the practice of arbitrary governance in independent Pakistan.

In effect, Pakistan's post-1947 socio-economic model and its levels of poverty constitute a vicious circle that is extremely hard to break. Even though Pakistan's fragile economy has been unable to support it, the military spending in the country has always been exorbitant. Lacking the resources to solve the core problems of poverty, underdevelopment and regional divide, the establishment has considered it to be politically expedient to revert to themes seen as non-controversial and unifying (e.g. the threat perception); the idea has always been to use whatever method available to muster the political support of the masses¹⁰⁴.

Another aspect of the same Catch-22 situation relates to education, which can only be seen as a threat to the influence exerted by the numerous religious groups. On the one hand, the vicious circle of poverty in Pakistan largely derives from the absence of a sound education policy and lack of infrastructure; on the other hand, the lack of educational infrastructure has caused madrassas (madrasah), centres for training religious zealots and militants, to mushroom¹⁰⁵, and turns poverty into a self-feeding process of illiteracy, violence and extremism in society. General Musharraf is quite right in stressing the importance of alleviating poverty in his country, but that alone – without profound restructuring of Pakistan - might not be an adequate recipe for a modern Islamic welfare state confidently marching into the 21st century.

¹⁰³ As officially announced in "ADB Plans To Provide Pakistan With US\$2.4 Billion Over Three-Year Period", <http://www.adb.org/Documents/News/2002/nr2002099.asp>.

¹⁰⁴ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, "Can Pakistan Turn Around?", *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁰⁵ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, *ibid.*

FROM HINDSIGHT TO FORESIGHT

*'Has there come on man a while of time
when he was a thing unremembered?.'*
Holy Quran, Man, Introductory Verses¹⁰⁶

Could the Story Have Been Different?

Fifty-five years ago, Pakistan emerged at a critical point of history in a critical part of the world, as the fifth most populous country and the largest Muslim nation worldwide. Since its very birthday, the new state had to face a number of grave challenges, such as its sprawling two-wing geography of East Pakistan and West Pakistan¹⁰⁷, the enormous intricacies of nation-making and state-building as well as a gigantic adversary next door, India. There can be no doubt as to the scale of these difficulties; none of them was less than formidable.

Striving to carve out a national identity, Pakistan's leadership had from the very beginning to grapple with the confrontation of competing ethnic groups, with only Islam serving as a tenuous link. Pakistani nationalism, unlike Indian, Malayan or Nigerian nationalism, was not based on a historically established and geographically well-defined political entity. That led to an exclusive focus on Islamic identity, almost by default.¹⁰⁸

One would have expected to see the appeal of Islam weaken at that point of time, after the shock of the split with Bangladesh. If religion had been a *raison d'être* for the creation of Pakistan and a 'common denominator' during the *Years of Innocence* (1947-1958), the two military regimes over the span 1958-1971 can be regarded as a response to the failure of Islam to play that important part in the constitution of the new state; in a way, the 1971 break-up of Pakistan only came to seal that failure. Yet, what followed the collapse of the Two-Nation Theory was a period of further Islamisation (1971-1977), even if in a rather opportunist manner at the beginning, and then of intensive use of Islam as a tool meant to legitimise the Zia regime (1977-1988). If Zulfikar Ali Bhutto used Islam in a populist way, aimed at increasing his popularity, *Zia par excellence* turned Islam into a day-to-day political

¹⁰⁶ Arthur J. Alberry, *op. cit.*, p. 621.

¹⁰⁷ It has rightly been stressed that Pakistan emerged from the partition as a 'two-headed' state, Jean-Luc Racine, *ibid.*

device. In both cases, however, Jinnah's legacy of viewing religion as a source of inspiration and an all-uniting cultural background was clearly distorted and abused.

The situation is perhaps best set out by a renowned, even if controversial, intellectual:

'... Pakistan has never been a mullah-dominated society. The religious extremists of the Jamaat[-i-Islami] party have their supporters among college students and so forth, but relatively few people have ever voted Jamaat in an election ... the so-called Islamic 'fundamentalism' does not spring in Pakistan from the people. It is imposed on them from above. Autocratic regimes find it useful to espouse the rhetoric of faith, because people respect that language [and] are reluctant to oppose it. This is how religions shore up dictators; by encircling them with words of power, words which people are reluctant to see discredited, disenfranchised, mocked.'¹⁰⁹

Such an approach may be partly true. Indeed, this view seems to be corroborated by the small political electoral weight of the Jamaat-i-Islami and other religious parties after Zia's authoritarian regime (see election results in the late 1980s and 1990s, as presented in Annex IV). It is true that Pakistan never became an Iran of the 1979 Islamic revolution. However, the political weight of Islam in Pakistan for at least forty years, between 1947 and 1988, should not be neglected. During that period the Ulama proved successful on a number of occasions in indoctrinating the new-born state and permeating it with the main teachings of the Quran. In broad terms, it is Islam on the state's terms that carried the day during the fifty-five years of independence.¹¹⁰

Pakistan's leading élite has not been able to evolve a stable political system with high-quality leadership, and political experimentation at various times has delayed meaningful solutions for the economically distressed and socially fractured state. Ironically, the restoration of civilian rule upon Zia's death in 1988 did more to harm and discredit democracy rather than enhance it. As far as the National Assembly of Pakistan is concerned, it has never been in a position to play more than a decorative role and to impose its will on the military, the real linchpin of the country's years of independence.

¹⁰⁸ Mohammad Waseem, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Salman Rushdie, excerpts from his book *Shame*, New York: Aventura/Vintage, 1984, available at: <http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/pakistan/literature/rushdie/islam1.html> and <http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/pakistan/literature/rushdie/islam3.html>.

¹¹⁰ Mohammad Waseem, *ibid.*

Has the failure of Pakistan's political élite been caused exclusively by the fundamental internal weaknesses of the new state or by external factors? Once again, the answer may be halfway between the two conjectures. By no means should the threat perception of next-door India be ignored in legitimising the prominent role of the Pakistani military; nor could the high-politics priorities of the Cold War and the tolerance of the US for Zia's authoritarian rule be underestimated. Yet, that would be a lame excuse for the short-sightedness of the élite in clinging to the ideology of a 'strong centre', which brought about the insurmountable gap between Pakistan's two wings and eventually engendered the 1971 break-up.

In retrospect, the 55-year history of independent Pakistan could be seen as a long row of unfortunate moments, missed opportunities - even blunders – and tragic necessities. For instance, it was definitely unfortunate that Jinnah should die so soon, slightly more than a year after the emergence of the new state, thus leaving room for less able politicians and militant clergymen. Nor was it a stroke of luck for the new-born state that the military should gain such a prominent position from the very first days of independence, one that practically predetermined the main key of domestic politics for decades to come. In this light, the Bhutto-Sharif period of 'democracy discredited' (1988-1999) need not be blamed exclusively on the two prime ministers, but the missed opportunity of the 'democratic interregnum' is beyond doubt. What could hardly be characterised as anything less than a major blunder was the fact that the élite of pre-1971 Pakistan proved unable to keep the country together through devolving more power to the provinces, starting from East Pakistan. The nuclear capabilities of the two adversaries, India and Pakistan, can only be seen as a tragic necessity in the name of security in a region notoriously charged with controversy and mistrust.

Pakistan: What Kind of State?

It is much easier to define this 140-million strong country as what it is *not* rather than what it *is*. Pakistan emerged as a religion-state and hardly as a classical nation-state. It would be the ideal situation for Pakistan to be considered from a primordialist point of view, which would see it as a well-established nation, firmly rooted in history and having taken shape over the centuries. Indeed, primordialists stress the role of Islam in the Pakistan movement in pre-partition times as a source of

inspiration in its own right.¹¹¹ That, however, is hardly the case, as argued above : even if religion were taken as a determinant, Pakistan would still be a rather awkward nation-state. Furthermore, the pervasive idiom in the current historiography of South Asia is based on an instrumentalist approach to Islam in the Pakistan movement led by Jinnah. According to this school of thought, the Muslim League leadership developed a strategy of political mobilisation on the basis of an expedient use of Islamic rituals and symbols.¹¹²

This view may be further backed up by the notion of ‘territorial’ – rather than ethnic – nations, if one is to adopt Anthony Smith’s two main types of modern nations¹¹³. With Islam being the decisive, if not the only, factor for the creation of Pakistan out of the body of colonial India, could Pakistan be seen as a ‘one-issue state’? The Congress had developed a large-scale reformist platform of its own along its pursuit of independence for India, but the struggle of Muslim nationalists was confined to the one-point agenda of Pakistan.¹¹⁴ Along this line of thought, some authors explore Pakistan as an ‘ex-nihilo’ state rather than as a rejuvenated version of an older polity¹¹⁵. Even so, and despite centrifugal forces and regional nationalism, Pakistan cannot be seen as a quasi-state¹¹⁶, as its political leadership certainly has had a strong hold on power – even if too strong and highly questionable as to democratic methods, to put it mildly. Nor would it be accurate to suggest that Pakistan qualifies for a ‘failed state’, given its impressive – by any standards - ‘achievement’ of acquiring nuclear capabilities. Yet, the question may be worth posing. A nuclear power, displaying Pakistan’s dismal levels of poverty, can by no means be seen as a ‘welfare state’. An interesting attempt of recent at exploring rickety states distinguishes between those that ‘have ceased for at least a time to function as states’ (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia as examples of failing or failed states) and other, ‘vulnerable’, ones (e.g. in Central Asia and Southeast Asia).¹¹⁷ There is little doubt as to the vulnerability of Pakistan and, in fact, it may well qualify for the terms

¹¹¹ Mohammad Waseem, *ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Presented in Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Martin Van Creveld, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

¹¹⁶ The term ‘quasi-states’ refers to those states which, despite international recognition, often lack ‘substantial and credible statehood by the empirical criteria of classical positive international law’, Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 22

¹¹⁷ For details, see the presentation of the ‘Reinvigorating Failed States’ project of the World Peace Foundation at <http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/collapsed.html>.

‘potentially failing state’¹¹⁸ or ‘relatively weak state’ (one with low levels of socio-political cohesion).¹¹⁹ Add to that Pakistan’s behaviour as a ‘torn country’¹²⁰ in the wake of 11th September and the war in Afghanistan, in effect as a country whose leadership was pursuing a pro-western ‘bandwagoning’ strategy, while the strong religious background of the population seemed to point the other way.

Given this conspicuous vulnerability, it may not be unjustifiable in historic terms that the military has always enjoyed immense control over the decision-making process in the country, thus rendering Pakistan a military state. Which, eventually, seems to be the safest and most precise qualification for a state with the army as its most powerful institution and dominating it practically all along since its creation. Indeed, there appears to be no single public institution in Pakistan that can claim to have the sustainability of the armed forces.

What Is In Store for Pakistan?

No doubt, fifty-five years after it emerged on the world map Pakistan presents a sorry sight. At the dawn of the 21st century, its political life is both splintered and enveloped in multiple crises, the existence of a national feeling is being challenged by some¹²¹, the economy is in shambles and poverty is soaring at depressing levels. Confronted with an intense political divide, increasing economic problems, active drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, increasing societal violence, terrorism and sectarianism, Pakistan’s sense of insecurity has deepened more than ever before. Moreover, the country’s fourth military regime is facing a huge crisis of credibility and legitimacy as Pakistan’s long-held foreign policy assumptions and widely-accepted doctrines (e.g. involvement in Afghanistan) have collapsed in the face of new realities in the wake of 11th September 2001.¹²² In broad terms, the principal question is whether Pakistan has pragmatic thinkers to mediate the ideological battle

¹¹⁸ As opposed to the ‘failed state of Afghanistan’, according to Ahmed Rashid, in an interview of his given for the ‘Conversations with History’ series at Berkeley, available at <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Rashid/rashid-con7.html>.

¹¹⁹ Mark V. Kauppi and, Paul R. Viotti, “Asia and International Relations Theory: Hobbes Meets Gobden and Grotius”, *The Journal of International Studies*, Sophia University, Tokyo, No. 39, January 1997, p. 8.

¹²⁰ Samuel Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 42. The list of examples for ‘torn countries’ at the time of publication of the article (1993) included Turkey, Mexico and Russia.

¹²¹ ‘Virtually absent’ are the words used, M.B. Naqvi, *ibid.*

¹²² Mushahid Hussain, “Whither Pakistan's Establishment?”, *ibid.*

cutting across the country's soul and to reconcile a multitude of conflicting trends into workable political and social formulae.

Pakistan's military, to start from the country's most powerful political factor, may have to learn lessons from past mistakes and to hold a free, fair and transparent party-based election on schedule in October 2002. This means discarding any temptations to draw on past authoritarian practices and any plans for arbitrary constitutional amendments meant to 'monitor' an elected Parliament. At the same time, secularism should also be placed high on the political agenda of the country's leadership. Currently, General Musharraf is being seen by some as a 'local version of Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish leader who separated mosque and state in the twilight of the Ottoman Empire'¹²³, and there are indications that Musharraf's policy option of curbing militant Islamic groups in the wake of September 11th fits neatly into his vision of gradually returning Pakistan to a modern-minded Muslim state. To put it in his own words: 'Do we want Pakistan to become a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic Islamic welfare state? The verdict of the masses is in favour of a progressive Islamic state.'¹²⁴

Whether or not Musharraf's vision is feasible remains to be seen. For sure, however, his – and his successors' – task will be a daunting one. What has been called 'Quran under Sword' in this essay, i.e. the supremacy of the military élite over the clergy, may justify hopes for a reasonable restriction of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, but on a number of occasions Islamic militancy has burst out of control.¹²⁵ While Musharraf's attempt to reinvent his country's erstwhile image as a nation of Taliban supporters and *jihad* militants is being welcomed by educated Pakistanis, some say he may be sowing the seeds of a major backlash.¹²⁶ For all these reasons, Musharraf is unlikely to ban signs of religiosity, like in Turkey. However, he and the future leadership of Pakistan will definitely have to revisit Jinnah's legacy of viewing Islam as more of a source of inspiration rather than of political legitimacy.

¹²³ It is worth mentioning that Musharraf spent seven years of his childhood in Turkey, learned to speak Turkish, and even lists Ataturk as his 'most admired person', Ilene R. Prusher, "A Turkish path for Pakistan?", *The Christian Science Monitor*, 24 January 2002

¹²⁴ An excerpt from his 12 January 2002 address to the nation, Uwe Parpart, "Musharraf: Can this man change Pakistan?", *Asia Times Online*, <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DA18Df05.html>.

¹²⁵ The abduction and murder of the "Wall Street Journal" reporter Daniel Pearl in early 2002, and the June 2002 blast in Karachi killing 11 bus passengers are cases in point.

¹²⁶ Ilene R. Prusher, *ibid.*

Legitimacy, in turn, could be sought through devolution and development policies. Pakistan's leadership may need to update and even revise its 'strong centre' ideology in favour of more pronounced regional autonomy and bigger authority for the provinces in a spirit of pragmatic politics.¹²⁷ Next, the cost of maintaining large – and largely inefficient – armed forces at the expense of social services may have to be reconsidered. The cost-effectiveness of the Pakistani forces is next to dismal, and General Musharraf is reportedly considering thrift in defence spending, in order to get the most out of what is spent on the army.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, other analysts opine that any major overhaul of the military to make it leaner, more efficient and more productive is unlikely to occur.¹²⁹ Yet, despite the fact that the defence budget has always been kept away from the public debate, the growth of the social sector will have to be prioritised by the Pakistani leadership in the first place, not just by international donors. An increasing development budget is essential to overcoming the negative effects of social fragmentation and illiteracy-fed Islamic fundamentalism. Of course, this will entail huge cuts in the defence budget and will challenge the 'Indian threat' perception underpinning, *inter alia*, the military's institutional role.

The fear of India among the Pakistani policy-makers has always had a serious ideological orientation, the principal idea being that India cannot tolerate the existence of an Islamic Pakistan. Instead of hanging on the country's founding concept of 'us against them', Pakistan's political élite ought to pursue a more enlightening – rather than populist and misleading – role. Kashmir, of course, will remain on the Indo-Pakistan agenda for a long time and will no doubt be a major point of friction requiring military capabilities. Nevertheless, this intractable problem is a matter of diplomacy and will have to be disconnected from domestic politics. While no one disputes the formidable security challenges in South Asia, there is no reason why Pakistan should exclusively relate the search for a viable political system and national cohesion to an issue, which has considerably contributed to an unstable and insecure state. In all, a similar 'cool-off' approach should be applied to other fundamental challenges facing the country. If hindsight can feed foresight in a meaningful way, it is up to Pakistan to prove that the fifty-five years from Jinnah to Musharraf can be revisited as a source of useful lessons and wisdom.

¹²⁷ M.B. Naqvi, *ibid.*

¹²⁸ See Sultan Ahmed, "Enhancing the Defence Capability Through Cost Effectiveness", on the Internet site <http://www.defencejournal.com/dec99/enhacing.htm>.

ANNEX II

List of Main Political Events in Pakistan's History

Period of Time	Events
15 August 1947	India and Pakistan become independent states.
October 1947	The maharaja of Kashmir signs the so-called Instrument of Accession to India.
January 1948	India and Pakistan appeal to the United Nations, accusing each other of aggression in the disputed region of Kashmir.
September 1948	Death of Jinnah; Khawaja Nazimuddin takes over as the second Governor-General of Pakistan.
March 1949	The Constituent Assembly adopts the 'Objectives Resolution'.
16 October 1951	Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan is assassinated.
February 1952	An uprising of Bengali students in East Pakistan.
April 1953	Khawaja Nazimuddin is dismissed by the Governor General, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, and is replaced by Muhammad Ali Bogra.
October 1954	Malik Ghulam Muhammad dissolves the Constituent Assembly and declares a state of emergency in the country.
August 1955	Chaudhary Muhammad Ali is appointed the new Prime Minister.
February 1956	A new constitution is adopted; Pakistan formally becomes an Islamic Republic of Pakistan within the Commonwealth of Nations.
March 1956	General Iskander Mirza is elected the first president of the country.
September 1956	Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy is appointed Prime Minister.
October 1957	Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar is appointed interim Prime Minister by the President.
December 1957	Malik Feroz Khan Noon takes over the office of Prime Minister.
October 1958	President Mirza abrogates the constitution and grants power to the army under General Muhammad Ayub Khan.
October 1958	Twenty days later Iskander Mirza is ousted by General Ayub Khan who declares himself President.
February 1960	A referendum is held, as a result of which Ayub Khan is elected President for five years and is given the mandate to select a Constitution for Pakistan.
March 1962	End of martial law. A new constitution is enforced, introducing the co-called 'Basic Democracy' and 'non-party politics'.
September 1965	War with India over Kashmir breaks out.
January 1966	President Ayub Khan and India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri reach an accord in Tashkent at a meeting sponsored by the USSR.
November 1967	The then Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto resigns from office and forms the Pakistan People's Party.
March 1969	Ayub Khan resigns and hands the government over to General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, head of the army. Martial law is declared.
December 1970	First direct universal voting since independence; victory of the Awami League of East Pakistan.
March-Dec. 1971	Indo-Pakistan war; East Pakistan becomes Republic of Bangladesh.

Period of Time	Events
December 1971	Yahya Khan resigns; Bhutto takes over as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator.
July 1972	Bhutto signs the Simla Agreement with India allowing exchange of occupied territories and POWs of the 1971 war.
April 1973	A new Constitution is approved by the National Assembly.
August 1973	Bhutto is sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan; Chahary Fazal Illahi is appointed President.
July 1977	The Chief of Army Staff, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, suspends the Constitution and imposes Martial Law.
April 1979	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is executed after a politically motivated trial.
March 1981	A provisional Constitution enforced in Pakistan.
December 1984	Referendum on Islamisation; General Zia becomes President.
March 1985	General Zia-ul-Haq passes the 8th Amendment in the Constitution, empowering the President to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2b).
August 1988	General Zia is killed in an air crash; Ishaque Khan, Chairman of the Senate, becomes the next acting President of Pakistan.
November 1988	Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, is sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
October 1990	Elections are held for the National and Provincial assemblies. Nawaz Sharif, the ex-Chief Minister of Punjab, becomes Prime Minister.
April 1993	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolves the National Assembly; Mir Balakh Sher Khan Mazari is appointed as the caretaker Prime Minister.
May 1993	The Supreme Court invalidates the presidential order and reinstates Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister of the country.
July 1993	Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif; Moin Qureshi is appointed the caretaker Prime Minister, and Ghulam Ishaq Khan the caretaker President.
October 1993	Elections are held and Benazir Bhutto takes oath as Prime Minister.
November 1996	President Farooq Leghari dismissed Benazir Bhutto's government on Charges of corruption and mismanagement.
April 1997	Nawaz Sharif removes Art. 58 (2b) through the 13th Amendment in the Constitution.
May 1998	Pakistan successfully carried out six nuclear tests in the province of Baluchistan, as a response to nuclear explosions by India two weeks earlier.
February 1999	A visit to Pakistan by the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee; the "Lahore Declaration" is signed by the two Prime Ministers.
May-August 1999	Hostilities between the Indian army and separatists near Kargil in Kashmir.
October 1999	General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, ousts Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and assumes the title of Chief Executive.
June 2001	General Pervez Musharraf takes over the office of President of Pakistan.
11 th Sept. 2001	Terrorist attach on New York and Washington.
October 2001	Anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan is launched.
December 2001	Terrorist attack on India's Federal Parliament; tension increases between India and Pakistan.
April 2002	General Musharraf holds a referendum extending his power by another five years.
May 2002	Pakistani army proceeds to three missile tests.

Various sources. A convenient on-line source to consult would be [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+pk0011](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pk0011).

ANNEX I

The Objectives Resolution (12 March 1949)

1. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone; but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust;
2. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;
3. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;
4. The Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
5. Adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;
6. Pakistan shall be a Federation;
7. Fundamental rights shall be guaranteed;
8. Judiciary shall be independent.

Source: <http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A054>.

ANNEX IV

Parliamentary Elections in Pakistan, 1988-1997

Party	Nov 16 1988	Oct 24 1990	Oct 6 1993	Feb 3 1997
Pakistan People's Party - PPP	92	45	92	17
Pakistan Muslim League (N)- PML-N	-	-	75	134
Pakistan Muslim League (J) - PML-J	-	-	6	-
Islamic Democratic Alliance-IJI	92	45	-	-
Mohajir National Movement-MQM	13	15	-	-
Mohajir National Movement –MQM-A	-	-	-	12
Awami National Party—ANP	-	-	3	9
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam—JUI/S	8	-	-	-
Islamic Democratic Front—IJM	-	-	4	-
Pakhtun Quami Party—PKQP	-	-	1	-
Pakhtun Khwa National People's Party— PKMAP	-	-	4	-
Baluchistan National Party—BNP	-	-	-	3
Balochistan National Movement, Hayee - BNM/H	-	-	1	-
Balochistan National Movement, Mengal - BNM/M	-	-	1	-
Pakistan Islamic Front—PIF	-	-	3	-
Republican Nation Party—JWP	-	-	2	1
Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan—JUP	-	-	-	2
Mutaheda Deeni Mahaz—MDM	-	-	2	-
National People's Party—NPP	-	-	1	1
National Democratic Alliance—NDA	-	-	1	-
independent	-	21	9	20
other	40	20	-	1
vacant	-	-	-	7
unawarded	-	-	2	-
Total	207	207	207	207

Source: <http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations/nation/PK.htm>

ANNEX III

Defence Expenditure of Pakistan: 1970-2000

Year	In Million Rupees	As Share of Total Expenditure (%)
1970-71	3,202	55.7
1971-72	3,726	59.1
1972-73	4,440	59.3
1973-74	4,949	42.2
1974-75	6,914	42.8
1975-76	8,103	25.1
1976-77	8,103	23.1
1977-78	9,675	23.7
1978-79	10,302	21.0
1979-80	12,655	23.2
1980-81	15,300	23.2
1981-82	18,631	24.5
1982-83	23,224	26.7
1983-84	26,798	26.8
1984-85	31,866	27.3
1985-86	35,606	26.5
1986-87	41,335	27.1
1987-88	47,015	26.1
1988-89	51,053	25.4
1989-90	58,708	26.5
1990-91	64,623	24.8
1991-92	75,751	23.6
1992-93	87,441	25.0
1993-94	91,776	25.2
1994-95	100,221	23.4
1995-96	115,252	23.3
1996-97	131,400	26.3
1997-98	133,834	26.2
1998-99	145,000	26.1
1999-2000	142,000	22.0

Sources: The Military Balance 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS); Jasjit Singh, Defence Expenditure in South Asia, An Overview, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Policy Studies 10, Colombo, 2000, pp. 53-54.

Defence Versus Development Spending as Share of GDP (%) (1990-1999)

Fiscal Year	Health	Education	Defence
1990-91	0.7	2.1	3.0
1991-92	0.7	2.2	6.2
1992-93	0.7	2.2	6.5
1993-94	0.7	2.2	5.8
1995-96	0.6	2.4	5.4
1996-97	0.8	2.5	5.4
1997-98	0.7	2.3	4.9
1998-99	0.7	2.2	4.8

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, 1998-99.

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