

Ideas of Two-Track Security Cooperation Framework for the Korean Peninsula: In the Context of EU's Security Cooperation

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I. Introduction

The US is facing global challenges in the post-cold war world. The contemporary world is distancing from the US-oriented order, more deeply plunging into the interdependent order in which security is irreversibly linked on the one hand and both regionalism and globalism are indissolubly interconnected on the other. These changes in the world order have brought about many new power centers, such as Japan, China, ASEAN, G-8, and Northeast Asia, BRICS, G-20, and G-2, all of which are capable of influencing security, economy, and diplomacy in both developed and developing countries. In these changing trends, the US has fostered new relationships with the new power centers while being dogged down in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea; in particular, the country has sparked the rise of Asia through the creation of a great liberal and open economic order. However, having played its leading role in combating global terrorism, the US has found itself diminished in its political, economic, diplomatic, and security influences on the world affairs. Such a contraction of American influence now reminds us that the extent of a country's predominant economic power is apt to be transformed into a corresponding military power over the long run.¹

Such changes in the contemporary world signal that the old style era Soviet Union and China containment policy will no longer work. Japan has certainly obtained the first rank of economic and financial player, stretching its influence to become a political player. The country has obtained a seat among the ten-elected nonpermanent members of Security Council of the United Nations. Moreover, it became the first donor state in the international community.

Following the post-cold war, the US thought that ASEAN was no longer useful or relevant. Washington thus gives little attention to strengthening relationships with ASEAN. Given this regional transformation, China has made

¹ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

constant efforts to influence ASEAN, now being close to making a China–ASEAN FTA and possibly a China–South Korea FTA. The country has further strengthened its diplomatic ties with this new power center – ASEAN in particular.

China has already launched its pre-emptive strikes against any possible American containment or its coercive diplomacy by sharing its prosperity with its neighbors. The country has recorded the constant ten-year or more trade surplus toward the US and has bought US\$ about trillion of the US treasury². This is the world's largest holder of US government debt. In this changing situation, the US once leaned toward China and Pakistan to balance Russia. Former US Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. The US has made efforts to contribute to global welfare with its partner China, convincing it that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active bilateral engagement with it.³ India was then forced to bend toward Russia to balance China and Pakistan. Recently the US has created the privileged relationships with India to balance Russia, China, and Pakistan through privileged nuclear cooperation.

These days the US harbors a broad idea to create a new regional order with itself, Australia, India, and Japan to counterbalance the rise of China. In the Korean Peninsula, the US successive administrations from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama failed to seek solutions to the long-dragged nuclearization ambitions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The constant diminution of American power has been seen especially in the security area of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK now is at odds with the US, especially in readjusting the overall security cooperation issue, and the latter is still in conflict with the DPRK in the protracted denuclearization issue.

II. Declining American Power in the ROK

The Nixon administration felt it necessary to rearrange its global strategy beginning in the late 1960s. The administration declared the Guam Doctrine on July 25, 1969, in which it began to distance itself from Asia. The Nixon

² IMF(2009), World Economy Outlook database.

³ William S. Cohen and Maurice R. Greenberg, *Smart Power in US–China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China*, March 2009, Center for Strategic & International Studies, p.2.

government had made endeavors to implement the containment strategy of the Soviet Union and China.⁴ Since 1971, the US has continually pulled its troops out of the ROK. According to the Nixon doctrine, its administration withdrew 20,000 troops of the total 61,000. The Carter administration, however, stopped implementing an additional pullout from the South on account of reliable information that the North Korean forces were assessed 30% stronger than originally estimated. The pullout was further halted by the US Congress opposition, as well as the influential American leaders' warnings.

Starting from the 1980s, the ROK launched a series of diversified diplomacy, through which the country made intensive efforts to modernize its military security capabilities, while maintaining, however, the Korea-US Alliance. In this situation, the country continued to modernize its troops. In January 1981, the Korea-US summit agreed not to carry out an additional troop's withdrawal, while recognizing the importance of the US deterrent on the Korean Peninsula.⁵

But a new situation occurred at the beginning of the 1980s. South Korea's trade surplus was made toward the US trade, causing conflicts between the two countries' markets. The Korean market became the second largest in Asia after the Japanese market. Thus the traditional relationship between Korea and the US turned into a bilateral and interdependent partnership. This change brought about the security burden-sharing issue between the two allied partners.

The Korea-US relationship in military and security entered a new partnership with the end of FMS in 1987. Later discussions had been raised over the wartime operational control.⁶ With the start of the Roh Tae-woo government, it launched a series of northern diplomacy which aimed at improving relationship with all socialist countries, if they are not hostile to the country. The government showed, however, a flexible policy toward the DPRK, with an important view of creating lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.⁷ With such shifts, the ROK gradually drew focus on pursuing a self-reliant path in diplomacy and security.

On the other hand, the US continued to restructure its military forces deployed in South Korea. At the end of the 1980s, the US adopted Amendment No.533 that aimed to restructure its deployed forces by changing the leading role

⁴ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 70-71.

⁵ The 1983 Major Issues, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982, p.1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.140.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

of the US. to a supporting role.⁸ The amendment intended to transfer more burden-sharing to the ROK in defense and security and to gradually reduce the size of ground forces, instead with strengthened air power.

The US emphasized, however, the strategic importance of East Asia by the East Asia Strategic Initiative of the 1990 Bottom Up Review and the Nye Report of 1992.⁹ The US has, however, been changing from the hard bonds of a security relationship to a complimentary role. The ROK has undertaken more security burden-sharing as the country has continued to make trade surplus to the US, while establishing an efficient security framework by strengthening the Korea-US Combined Defense Command. Nevertheless, American commitments to the security for the ROK have shifted from a leading role to a minor role. The Kim Young-sam government proposed to the Bill Clinton administration a four-party talk with South and North Korea, the US, and China participating for the sake of creating lasting peace and reducing tension on the peninsula. On the other hand, the ROK has, since then, pursued the creation of Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASD) that targeted improving the infrastructure of peace and security with the close diplomatic cooperation among the US, China, Russia, and Japan.¹⁰

The George W. Bush administration began redeploying US forces with the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) implementing, beginning in November 2003. The administration had to change its internal and external security policies in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks in 2001. It adopted as a primary agenda its efforts to strengthening the US security strategy and removing weapons of mass destruction in North Korea and other nuclear suspected terrorists as well. Accordingly, it set up an offensive security strategy based on anti-terrorism and its allied alliance strengthening, including single actions, or if necessary, pre-emptive attacks.¹¹

In line with its strategic shift, the Bush administration decided to redeploy the Second Division stationed in the DMZ to the rear area, which has played the tripwire role in the face of the long-range artillery attacks of North Korea. This

⁸ The US Senate Amendment No. 533; it was jointly proposed by McCain, Nunn, Warner, Exon, Dixon, Wirth, Shelby, Thurnmond, Cohen, Wallop, Gorton, Lott, and Coats July 31, 1989.

⁹ Joseph Nye, Jr., *East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.4 (July 1995), pp.90-102.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.145.

¹¹ *Mane Heo, The Politics of the Korean Peninsula: History consciousness and Retrospect, Second edition* (BUan: Jaeil Press, 2009), pp.107-8.

backward redeployment of the combat-ready second division, including the Eighth US Army Headquarters is likely to make an unfavorable security infrastructure in the South. It should be noticed that the DPRK is moving toward a 'military first country' equipped with both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles until 2012. Given this situation, the US intends to maintain a minimal role of security on the peninsula by preparing to turn over the wartime operational control to the ROK as originally scheduled for 2012. But when looking into the nature of its GPR, the Bush administration adopted an offensive realism that put aside the traditional deterrence and containment vis-à-vis the irrational Pyongyang regime and that focuses on preventive war aiming at attacking an imminent enemy that threatens US security. Preventive war was crafted to launch preemptive attacks against enemies at a moment of its immediate attacks even without clear evidence of danger to the US. This offensive realism is seen as a main source that moves toward the declining American power in South Korea and Northeast Asia.

III. Controversy over the Rearrangement of the Korea-US Alliance

Controversy has been long raised over the possible changes in the status of the Korea-US alliance beginning in the early 2000s. The world order had been highly strained during the Cold War, in which the Northeast Asian order had heavily depended on the Cold war confrontation. The ROK's security had entirely relied on the nuclear deterrent of the US and North Korea on the nuclear deterrent of the old Soviet Union and the security commitment of China. Decision-makers in South Korea feared another sudden withdrawal of US forces in the South would jeopardize the peace and security of South Korea and Northeast Asia. As a result, the peace and stability in the Pacific region would automatically be vulnerable to attacks of Asian neighbors -- China, Russia, and North Korea. A sudden pulling out of the American troops would of course result in a great strategic vacuum in the Northeast Asian region, as well as between the ROK and the DPRK.

Most of the South Korean conservatives supporting the status quo of the bilateral alliance have held opinion that North Korea redeployed more than 70% of its combat-ready forces around the demilitarized zone. They have opposed the claims of the American troops' pulling out and supported the US military presence in the South. On the other hand, the anti-military presence mood has been frequently plotted and pushed for by the South Korean leftists. Most conservatives

held the opinion that their pulling out would give dangerous signals to North Korea that it might foster a favorable chance to be able to disrupt the status quo of the bilateral alliance with the South.

However, the US feared in its 2000 Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2020 that the continued developing relations between South and North Korea during the last ten years might weaken the status of the American presence here. The US Senator Craig Thomas said that "there will be a pressure to pull US forces out of the South and a large amount of forces will no longer be necessary with its highly developed strategic power."¹² Deputy Secretary of US Defense Ministry, Paul Wolfowitz stated that the US can maintain a proper military strength by reducing its present troops, and troops can be strengthened instead by highly sophisticated military technologies.¹³

Larry M. Wortzel of the US Heritage already stressed that the role and aims of the American presence here should be ready to be redeployed anytime under any contingencies. American troops should be prepared to meet any challenge to political and economic changes. They should transform themselves properly and effectively to meet changes in the global security environment and serve rescue activities, with Northeast Asian allies.¹⁴

Director of CSS, Michael McDevitt stressed the evolutionary changes of the US forces' presence in the South: (1) an enlargement of US air power that can strengthen the reduced ground forces; (2) a redeployment of the reduced troops with a reduction of US air forces.¹⁵ Scot Snyder, Director of Seoul Office, Asian Foundation and his counterpart Professor Dalchoon Kim argued in their co-article that South Korea and the US openly should deal with the future of the UN Command, WMDs of North Korea, and a likely reduction of US forces in the South.¹⁶

Controversies have continued to be pushed over the troops' reduction.

¹² Chosun Daily, February 10, 2001.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Larry M. Wortzel, *Planning for the Future: The Role of US Forces in Northeast Asian Security*, <http://www.heritage.org/library/background/bg1383>, 2000/20; Charmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, *The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74 No4, July/August 1995.

¹⁵ Michael McDevitt, *US Forces in Korea: Status and Considerations Regarding Evolutionary Change*, presented at the conference The Korean Peninsula: Paths to Reconsideration and Reunification sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the American Council on Asian and Pacific Affairs, September 29–30, 2000, p.13.

¹⁶ Jeong, Se-Jin, *The International Relations of the East Asia and the Korean Peninsula: A New Approach to Peace*, Hanoul Press, 2002, p.28.

Doug Bandow of Cato Institute said that “South Korea exceeded North Korea by 30% in terms of GDP, industrial, and military capabilities and that in this situation the American presence is no longer needed.”¹⁷ In the same context, Selig Harrison said that “the present status of American presence continues to damage development of relations between South and North Korea, and thus its role and aims have to change. In the Cold War period, the Old Soviet Union and China positively responded to the security for North Korea, but today Russia is no longer a close allied power, and China is nothing but a nominal allied power.¹⁸ It largely has lost its warm heart toward North Korea unlikely the Cold War period.

IV. Strategic Flexibility of the Obama Administration

As far back as five years ago, the ROK and the US first addressed the “strategic flexibility” in the November 2005 APEC Summit. Both partners agreed to it in the January 19 2006 Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership. The key point of the agreement is that “the ROK fully understands the US global strategic transformation as the allied power, while the US will not intervene in conflicts in the Northeast Asian region without the will of the Koreans.”¹⁹ |

Application of the strategic flexibility definitively reached in the bilateral high strategy meeting is likely to affect the infrastructure of the bilateral alliance in the years to come. The leftist opinion was willing to accept the strategic flexibility mainly in fear if the self-reliant military capabilities of the ROK might be hindered. On the other hand, the conservative point on this issue was concerned that the US forces stationed here might eventually withdraw from the South.

The strategic flexibility substantially amounts to creating new forces of rapid redeployment in Northeast Asia, or forming units of rapid redeployment worldwide. This change in the present status of American troops signals that South Korean and American forces are expected to join a war or a conflict in common, as well as the common use of war materials and equipments.

The concept of the strategic flexibility to be applied to the ROK will be a

¹⁷ Doug Bandow, *Free Rider: South Korea's Dual Dependence on America*, Cato Institute Policy Analysis, No. 308, May 19, 1998, p.29.

¹⁸ Selig S. Harrison, *North Korea and Sunshine Policy*, presented at the conference sponsored by 24h Asia-Pacific Foundation, February 20 ,2000; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Future of the American Pacifier*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 5, September/October 2001.

¹⁹ Asia-Pacific Focus, Policy Research Series, Vol. IX. No. XXXIX, October 2006, p. 41.

main source to increase an uncertain and asymmetric strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula, because the DPRK is already armed with medium–and long–range missiles and nuclear weapons.

Recently, General Walter Sharp, Commander of the Eight US Army Headquarters announced that “the US can withdraw the American forces out of the South and that the bilateral forces would participate in a joint redeployment.”

²⁰ The US Quadrennial Defense Review indicated that the Obama administration would develop a more adaptive and flexible US combined forces posture on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance’s deterrent and defense capabilities.²¹ The review included a possibility to advance the ROK’s leading role in the combined defense of its territory together with the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK military in 2012.²²

The main strategic concept aims, among other things, to deploy the US forces in the South to overseas locations that will help to expand the pool of available forces for global contingencies. Thus the fixed size of the American forces and their permanent station in the South will have little meaning. As a result, the wartime operational control will be handed over to the ROK military, and the present Combined Forces Command will be automatically dismantled by April 17, 2012.

As the new strategic concept is sensitive and difficult to measure without in–depth consideration, the two allied governments are scheduled to wrap up negotiations by the end of 2010, so that they now hope to relocate the American troops to Pyongtaeck.²³ The Obama administration hopes to uphold strategic maneuverability of its forces and expand their scope worldwide, while the Lee Myong–bak government focuses on preventing the American troops from further pulling out of South Korea. With this expected strategic transformation, the former government can swiftly dispatch its troops in place here to other parts of the world after consultations possibly with the latter government. Washington had pledged that such rotation of its forces would not compromise South Korea’s security capabilities. Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a news conference in Washington in December 2009 that the “United

²⁰ The Interview of General Walter Sharp with journalists in Washington, December 14, 2009, <http://www.Pressian>.

²¹ The Korea Herald, Editorial Change to Alliance, February 9, 2010.

²² Ibid.

²³ Pyongtaeck is the area 100 km away from Seoul, ROK, in which all U,S, troops separately stationed here will be located by 2016.

States was very committed to 28,500 troops' presence in South Korea."²⁴

From the standpoint of the waning American presence here, the ROK faces heavy difficulties mostly resulting from the future operation of the new strategic flexibility on the five fronts.

First, the leftist Ro Moo-hyun government decided to accept the new strategic concept against the will of the absolute majority of the Korean public before the overall strengthening of ROK's military structure has carried through. It originally targeted to further foster self-reliant military capabilities. He thought that the US nuclear umbrella to the ROK was against the state sovereignty and has long damaged Korean national pride.

Second, this country is still subjected to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR). The former does not allow the South to go nuclear, while the latter does not permit it to develop missiles of more than three 300 km range. This means that the Seoul government no longer has the right to develop highly sophisticated conventional and nuclear capabilities under the two control regimes.

Third, the Korea-US Combined Forces Command is set to be dismantled by 2012. This means that the South will be deprived of joint combat warfare capabilities in case of a North Korean attack and that moreover, it no longer expects the arrival of US additional forces in case of an outbreak of war or contingencies on the peninsula.

Fourth, the US has already failed in the denuclearization of the peninsula, the primary pillar to the lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia as a whole. The denuclearization issue has remained unresolved since the 1991 Denuclearization Declaration issued jointly by the ROK and the DPRK. The Clinton administration and the Kim Young-sam government failed to resolve the nuclear issue when the 1994 Geneva Freeze Framework concluded. Furthermore, the six-parties in the fourth round of the September 19 2005 Six-Party Talks agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the issue with the principle of "commitment for commitment" and "action for action," but neither concrete commitments nor actions have been taken up so far. The third session of the fifth round of the February 13 2007 Six-Party Talks produced productive discussions aimed at

²⁴ There is a growing possibility that a redeployment of forces may result in the overall reduction of the 28,500 military stationed in South Korea. The US earlier 2009 pulled out two Apache chopper units; one unit was sent to Iraq and Afghanistan; the units were compensated with F-16 jets.

implementing the joint statement, and the six-parties reaffirmed it in a phased manner in line with the principle of action for action, but it failed to have brought any definitive solutions to the denuclearization issue.

Fifth, the Pyongyang regime is still suspected of illegally exporting missiles, their related technologies, and other weapons to rogue states as evidenced in the seizure of a Georgia-registered air cargo loaded with a large number of different weapons.²⁵ This export of arms directly violates the UN Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1878 sanctions²⁶, which all aimed to impose economic sanctions on North Korea, with a ban on the exportation of luxury goods and large-scale arms-related materials, technology, and services to North Korea, as well as on the importation of North Korean heavy arms. Such violations by North Korea directly threaten the environment of peace and stability and leads to the proliferation of terrorism throughout the world.

The April 13 2010 Nuclear Summit shows that Obama's strategic flexibility designed at worldwide defense and security went one step further. He unveiled the first-ever bold policy of nuclear balance in the endeavor of creating a nuclear-free world, with the support of 47 countries. He hoped, however, that steps toward disarmament would be accompanied by measures to retain America's nuclear primacy. The latest US Nuclear Posture Review released on April 6, 2010 aimed to further reduce America's reliance on nuclear weapons by adopting an almost no-first-use doctrine. Only in "extreme circumstances" would

²⁵ The Korea Herald, December 16 to 17, 2009; Thai authorities seized 35 tons of explosives, rocket-propelled grenades and missile parts on a Georgia-registered flight when it landed in the Bangkok airport for refueling on December 16, 2009. They confiscated the North Korean arms under the U.N. resolutions 1718 and 1874, which were violated again by the North Korea's smuggling acts of arms. The next steps in Bangkok were scheduled to report this incident to the UN's North Korea's Sanctions Committee, the so-called 1718 committee, which has a mandate to investigate and take appropriate actions.

According to the May 17 2010 Korea Herald, Israel's Foreign Minister Vigdor Lieberman insisted that the seizure of arms was heading to Hamas and Hezbollah, the militant Islamist and Shiite movements.

²⁶ The UN Resolution 1695 aimed to impose sanctions on missile proliferators. China blocked more sweeping proposals from the US and Japan. The Resolution 1718 targeted to impose an embargo on exports of heavy weapons, dual-use of items, and luxury goods upon North Korea, as well as on importation of heavy weapons from North Korea. North Korean UN Ambassador Pak Gil-yon called the resolution "gangster-like," and the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement reiterating that sanctions were an act of war and threatening a "merciless strike" against any state that implemented the UN resolution.

the US consider using nuclear weapons.²⁷ This doctrine is committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are in compliance with NPT even if they attacked the US with biological or chemical weapons. These threats could be deterred with “a series of gradual options”²⁸ – a combination of old and newly designed conventional weapons. From a long perspective of nuclear strategy, the Obama administration seems to be focused on pushing for a closer cooperation with Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom to renew arms control and to reduce nuclear forces while maintaining a stable military balance.

The primary aim of the new nuclear doctrine is to deter or respond expediently to nuclear attacks, but it is obscure and not well founded how the US can defend or discourage preemptive nuclear strike (first nuclear strike), even though the US and Russia signed the new START in which both agreed to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675 units, as well as their delivery of weapons to between 500 and 1,100 units.²⁹ It is an ambitious chapter in disarmament, but it lacks micro-measures to provide an effective and early warning mechanism for such contingencies.

The serious point is that the Nuclear Summit and the new START failed to adopt concrete measures for how nuclear weapons technology can be deterred from being introduced into Iran for full nuclear weapons development and how to effectively abolish nuclear facilities in Yongbyun, North Korea. It also lacked a technique or mechanism to keep nuclear weapons and their related materials out of terrorist hands. Micro-supervision mechanisms over the spread of nuclear weapons and their technologies were not presented. Such flawed nuclear approaches by the Obama administration still left South Korea vulnerable to a nuclear attack by North Korea.

V. Necessity of Two-Track Security Framework: Role of the EU's Security Cooperation

Leaders from the EU and Asia have recently turned their eyes to a new international order since the post-Cold War. They began to rely on interdependent and multilateral cooperation in trade and investment emerged in the era of globalization. Many elites of the EU and Asia have stressed the linkage between

²⁷ The Korea Herald, April 14, 2010.

²⁸ The Korea Herald, April, 7, 2010.

²⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START, April 15, 2010.

the two regions, even though geographically separated and culturally heterogeneous. The EU and especially the ROK share the basic political and economic values – democracy and market economy. Both partners have been conscious of the necessity of linkage in efforts to accommodate the new international order.

Back in 1989, ASEM occupied 63% of the world exports, some 38% of the world trade, and exceeded APEC (30%) and NAFTA (13%). From the standpoint of GDP of its member states, ASEM occupied 54% of the total production in the world, but it was not equivalent to APEC (62%), and it exceeded NAFTA (35%).³⁰ In 2009, the EU made 28.4% in GDP while the US secured 24.6%.³¹

Once the Korea–EU FTA comes into effect, such figures in exports, trade and investment will double, further increasing the link between the EU and Northeast Asia/East Asia on the one hand and in particular the EU and the ROK on the other. Such linkage motivated the leaders of the EU and the ROK to have concluded the Korea–EU FTA.

South Korea, Northeast Asia and East Asia came to be viewed by many in the EU as a political and strategic partnership, as well as the most lucrative emergent markets. These changes reflect that multilateralism has been increasing between the EU and these parts of the world.

Unlike the EU, Northeast Asia has lacked multilateral security organizations. Leaders in this region have mentioned Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASCD), and at times they stressed the importance of regional multilateral security organizations. The South Korea government especially has pushed for NEASCD during the first ARF–SOM as a governmental level multilateral cooperation mechanism (track-I) in Northeast Asia. NEACD and NEASCD, quadripartite talks as the non-regular organizations have hindered their leaders from developing into a security regime. As a result, the two organizations practically have done nothing. Now Northeast Asia in particular needs a regional multilateral security organization such as OSCE, NATO and WEU as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Especially, South Korea facing the nuclear threats of North Korea has long lacked these organizations that deal with the issues of security and peace. From the absence of multilateral security

³⁰ Mane Heo, *The Politics of European Integration—From Community to Union*, (Busan: Sejong Press, 2004), p.223.

³¹ IMF, *World Economy Outlook Database*, 2009.

situation did the ideas of two-track security framework originate.

The EU, as a firmly established international player, has made consistent efforts to move toward a higher level of cooperation with the backing of the member states in foreign and security policy, and recognized the need of political and strategic cooperation with Northeast Asia/East Asian countries.³² The first breakthrough was made in foreign, security and defense policy in the late 1990s as the EU decided to strengthen the Common Foreign and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the context of the CFSP. With the St.Malo Franco-British Summits in December 1998, substantial progress was made in CFSP with the creation of the ESDP. In the wake of the Balkan failure, the two summits pledged to strengthen the EU's framework to fulfill the Amsterdam commitments for the Petersburg Tasks.³³ Under ESDP, the EU could have dispatched the military and police forces to areas of crisis and conflicts to carry out humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, crisis management, and even peacemaking. These military actions were carried out by an EU rapid reaction force independent of NATO but with access to NATO resources.

No single European and Asian country today is capable of initiating major security and defense policies in the era of globalized world. It is no longer possible for a single state to pursue a medium-and-long-range peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. And no single country can prevent both nuclear proliferation and terrorism from spreading throughout the world. Multilateral security and defense thus came to require further collective actions and cost-sharing with others. This is a more effective and enduring measure for security and defense in the 21st century. The process has been developed in the domains of the CFSP and the ESDP.

Policy-makers of the 27-member EU have recognized the incremental need to extend the "community method" into these fields for more flexible, effective, and global policy implementations at the Union level. The creation of key institutional units such as the High Representative for the CFSP, the Council Secretariat and the Policy Unit has furthered the applicability of the structural patterns of an *acquis politique* to these domains – the Brusselization of national foreign

³² William van der Geest, Jørgen Delman, Signe Brunn-Jensen, "Can the EU Play a Meaningful Role in Asian Security?" Timo Kivimäki and Jørgen Delman (eds.), *The Security Situation in Asia: Changing Security Structure?* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), p. 13.

³³ Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair, "Joint Declaration on European Defense," British-French Summit, St. Malo, 3-4 December 1998.

policies.³⁴ These developments have been made as illustrated in table –1 below

Table 1: The use of instruments in the CFSP

	2001	2003	2005
Joint actions (including implementation decisions)	19	20	42
Common positions (including implementation decision)	20	20	29
Agreements with third countries (art. 24 TEU)	2	16	15
Decisions on ESDP by PSC			13
Other Council decisions on ESDP			5
Other Council decisions related to CFSP	6	13	10
Declarations	196	150	153
Demarches	442	606	292
Political Dialogue	306	228	134
Joint reports from diplomatic missions in third countries	278	391	258

Source: Regesberger, FORNET:CSFP Forum, Vol.5, Issue 4 (July 2007)

As illustrated in the table–1, leaders of the EU have striven to strengthen the relevant instruments of its foreign policy including the military mechanism aimed at promoting its diversifying practical interest, as well as upholding some fundamental values and ideas.³⁵ This is well exemplified by the provisions on the CFSP and ESDP of the aborted European Constitution and of the Lisbon Treaty. Despite some uncertainties related to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and various constraints against foreign and defense policy integration, the EU has consistently made efforts to increase ESDP operations, change the security role of NATO and the US, domestic restraints against defense budget increase, and intensify competition in global arms market and the general trends of the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA). It seems quite likely that with these developments the EU will move a step further towards ever closer inter–state

³⁴ Elfried Regesberger, “The EU as an Actor in Foreign and Security Policy: Some Key Features of CFSP in a Historical Perspective,” FORNET:CFSP Forum, Vol. 5, Issue 4 (July 2007),pp.7–8.

³⁵ Michael E. Smith, “Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, No.1 (2004), pp.95–116.

cooperation and gradual policy integration, thus increasing, although not satisfactorily yet, coherence and consistency in foreign and security policy.

With the adoption of the New Asia Strategy in 1994, the EU has been deeply involved in trade and investment cooperation in Northeast Asia/East Asia. This strategy is viewed as furthering complimentary interests between the EU and Northeast Asia/East Asian countries while reflecting the former security interests in the latter's. The EU seems to have recognized the dynamics and diversities in these parts of the world.

The adoption of this New Asia Strategy reflected a symbol of linkage politics in the EU's foreign and security policy considerations in a multilateral world. In this context, the EU showed its deep cooperation to the 1997–98 East Asian financial crisis and the “East Asian Value” debates.³⁶ However, the EU showed less engagement in the North Korean nuclear development ambitions, the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, and the long standing frictions between the EU and China. It seems likely that the EU's less engagement in this region was mainly due to the Northeast Asia and East Asian international order established by the US and the deep influences dominated by it. Such a negative engagement partly resulted from the EU's weak standing in the regional political and security dynamics. The EU approached closer to Northeast Asia and East Asia on September 6, 2001, just before the September 11 terror attacks. The EU adopted a new guideline titled “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Cooperation.”³⁷ The new strategic framework by the European Commission as another symbol of linkage politics aimed to reappraise its shortcomings of the previous strategy and adopted six key objectives in the EU's common policy towards East Asia.³⁸ The EU has been interested in further increasing both economic and security cooperation both in Europe and these regions, as well as the spreading of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Following the September 11 terror attacks, the EU decided to adopt a common policy to deal with the sources

³⁶ Geest et alias, *op. cit.*, p.14.

³⁷ European Commission, “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership,” COM (2001) 469 final, Brussels, 4 September, 2001.

³⁸ The six objectives consist of: (1) Promotion of peace and security in the region and globally; (2) Mutual trade and investment flows; (3) Development of the less prosperous countries of the region and other regions; (4) Human rights protection, spreading of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law; (5) Global partnership and alliances with Asian countries; and (6) Strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia and vice versa, in Daewon Ohn, “The EU and East Asian Security,” *The Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 27, No.2 (Summer 2009).

of threats related with East Asia by cooperating with this region and a number of intergovernmental organizations such as ASEM and ASEAN Forum(ARF). The EU thus came to further develop the regional relationships and these organizations.

Directly related factors favorable for fostering the two-track framework in the context of the EU's security cooperation are reflected in the five decisive events -- the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the continuing ASEM process, the conclusion of the Korea-EU FTA, and the hosting of the G-20 in Seoul in 2010. On the other hand, the sinking of the South Korean patrol warship by North Korea has to be addressed as a negative factor but a promoting one for the two-track framework idea. The five events are construed as the direct channels of linkage politics between the two regions.

First, the EU participated as a member of Executive Board of KEODO³⁹ in constructing as an immediate goal of two light-water reactors for the sake of replacing the North Korean graphite-moderated reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, which was producing a large amount of plutonium. The KEDO project was to deter further nuclear proliferation and to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula as a long term goal. The EU paid US \$122,377,723 to the KEDO project for burden-sharing, additionally with Austria's \$14,444,400, Germany's €1,011,485, and France's €503,778 to name but a few. This manifested the EU's increasing security concerns over the Korean Peninsula, and it is a change in its security strategy that intends to accommodate the era of multilateral cooperation between Europe and the Korean Peninsula. This means that Asians and Europeans consider the security linkage inseparable for both continuing economic and security cooperation in both regions.

Second, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) started with the sublime goal of promoting dialogues in various arenas between the EU and Asian countries. ASEM

³⁹ Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established in March 9, 1995 by the agreement between the US and North Korea which was signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994. It targeted to construct two light-water reactors and to be completed by 2008 in a form of turnkey contract, but it stopped in mid-construction due to strategic conflicts between the US and North Korea. The light-water reactors are patterned after the South Korean standard nuclear plant model with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts each. South Korea was responsible for paying 70% of the total construction budget, while the US was responsible for providing heavy fuel oil(US\$ 405,106,000) with North Korea as the alternative energy. According to the Executive Board's decision of November 14, 2002, KEDO made no deliveries of heavy fuel oil to North Korea in 2005. KEDO's member states are Argentine, Austria, Czech Republic, Chile, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, the United States, and Uzbekistan.

aims to lie not so much in regional integration as in pushing forward inter-regional multilateralism. However, ASEM has largely stressed political dialogue as well as economic, trade, investment, and cultural cooperation. The Second London ASEM already played a good example of linkage politics by especially strengthening political dialogue.

The Seoul Third ASEM in particular is the first official commitment to peace and security toward the Korean Peninsula. With this commitment, the Third ASEM continued to strengthen the linkage politics in particular by adopting many of the major policy recommendations suggested by the Asia–Europe Vision Group (AEVG).⁴⁰ It presented itself as a stage for inter-regionalism. As a linkage politics, it intended to continue fostering a common prosperity for a common sphere of living between Asia and the EU in the 21st century. It seems to be entering a much more important process of multi-dimensional cooperation. It is therefore worth quoting some parts of the executive summary of the AEVG as follows:

*Our vision is gradually to integrate Asia and Europe into an area of peace and shared development, a prosperous common living sphere in the 21st Century. This is a sphere in which our knowledge, wealth, cultural heritage, democratic ideals, educational assets, intellectual aspirations and our new technologies are intertwined and exchanged, without specific barriers or constraints. We envision the active integration of our intellectual forces and a vibrant exchange of culture and arts between Asia and Europe. We envision correction in today's imbalance in student number between Europe and Asia, with a five-fold expansion in student exchange between the two regions by the year 2025. We also visualize the progressive opening of markets with the eventual goal of free flow of goods and services by 2025. Integral to our vision are concrete actions to meet the serious environmental challenges today.*⁴¹

Leaders of the ASEM countries vowed to work together in such broad issues as prevention of conflicts, arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They also expressed their commitment to tackling

⁴⁰ Asia–Europe Vision Group (1999), “For a Better Tomorrow: Asia–Europe Partnership in the 21st century,” Seoul, 1999. Asia–Europe Vision Group was first organized in April 1998 and worked for a year until 1999. AEVG was a hoc meeting in preparation for suggesting in advance important policy recommendations to 25 Heads of States and Governments for a successful summit.

⁴¹ Asia–Europe Vision Group (1999), For a Better Tomorrow: Asia–Europe Partnership in the 21st Century, Seoul, 1999.

global issues such as money laundering, human trafficking, drug-trafficking, international terrorism, piracy, racism, infectious diseases, and food security.⁴²

In addition, they expressed at the summit their explicit concerns with security on the Korean Peninsula. They issued the “Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” in which they demonstrated their strong support for implementing the South–North Joint Declaration including humanitarian issues. They renewed the support that the joint declaration will continue to develop, creating lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. They did not fail to affirm ASEM partners’ willingness to contribute to measures that build confidence while enhancing peace and security on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia/ East Asia. This is by far the strongest determination to maintain a peaceful environment that the EU has committed to South and North Korea, as well as Asia as a whole⁴³. Commensurate with the policy guideline set in 2001, the EU began to develop various bilateral and multilateral cooperative channels. With interregional ties with East Asia through ASEM, the EU launched a number of partnerships and cooperative programs, including ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC). The EU has also developed strategic partnerships with China, India, Japan, and ASEAN for FTAs.

Two other ASEM processes are also worth being observed in terms of security and economic development concerns. In the wake of the September 11 terror attacks, the fourth ASEM held in Copenhagen in 2002 focused a special attention on anti-terrorism and security threats by declaring “Unity and Strength in Diversity” in a rapidly changing world order. The seventh ASEM organized in Beijing, 2008, announced sustainable development between the two regions. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao also announced his willingness to strengthen and deepen the Asian–European partnership for keeping sustainable development.⁴⁴

Third, the conclusion of the Korea–EU FTA should be pointed out as another milestone for the two-track security framework design. In principle, the FTA is designed to secure the equal opportunities to expand bilateral markets each other; South Korea can secure footholds in Europe for further extending its

⁴² Chairman’s Statement of the Third Asia–Europe Meeting, Seoul. October 21, 2000.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, China, 2008.

markets toward EU markets, the world's second largest economic bloc, accounting for around 33% of the global economy, while the EU is most likely to ensure footholds in the ROK for extending its markets toward Northeast Asia/East Asian markets. If both partners pushed forward with the continuing successful operations of the FTA, they would, to be sure, secure higher competitiveness in both markets.⁴⁵

First of all, the bilateral FTA is considered a solid bond that can link a security relationship between South Korea and the EU, because it can develop more trade creation effect between the two regions than trade diversion effect. In addition to this, from the long term prospects, the FTA will create a large scale economy by dismantling tariffs and related tariff barriers, increasing trade and investment, bringing about reciprocal economic growth, employment opportunities, and developing reciprocal industrial competitiveness in both regions. Therefore it is expected not only to increase market but overall economic effect which in turn will foster a stable economic environment in both.

As a next goal for combined security cooperation, the ROK and the EU can reasonably avoid conflicts as both regions have higher expectations on mutual economic benefits when the FTA fully comes into force. Consequently, mutual economic benefits will bring about a spillover effect to the high political area-- security commitment of the EU toward the peace and stability on the peninsula and vice versa. Complimentary economic cooperation networks will naturally link to complimentary security cooperation networks.

In another initiative for this security effort, the FTA will provide both regions with more possibilities and opportunities for future negotiations that from a long term perspective can handle conflicts and balance mutual interests with less cost and conflict. At last, an increasing perception on mutual interests will draw both regions much closer to future security concerns for Northeast Asia/East Asia, as well as for the Korean peninsula.

As it is to stress by nature the principle of reciprocity, South Korea and the EU are obliged to open their respective trade and economic operations as a whole, which in turn will keep balancing reciprocal interests between the two partners.

⁴⁵ Yang, Oh-Suk, "Conclusion of Korea-EU FTA and its Economic Effect", Samsung Economic Research Institute, presented at the Biennial International Conference on May 6-7, 2010 under the sponsorship of PNU-EU Center, BUSn, South Korea, p.7.

From a long-term vision, it will develop interdependent frameworks of economy and security between the two, which will inevitably enlarge economic flows and gradually build a greater confidence between the two, fostering reciprocal security interest. Such a security interest is most likely to be the bond of solidarity between the two partners in efforts to sustain and develop the bilateral FTA by jointly containing or reducing the sources of internal and external threats.

From the long-term political and economic prospects, it will first foster closer mutual economic cooperation, close mutual diplomatic cooperation, and greater confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), which in consequence will bring forth political-economic-security spill-over effects between both regions.

As Ravenhill put it, participating states in regional trade agreements are inclined to search political and economic influence, and to strengthen negotiating capacity.⁴⁶ As Mansfield pointed out, regional trade agreements based on FTA models are inclined by nature to reduce tensions and chronic problems between member states involved and to gradually yield security spill-over effects aimed at guaranteeing peace. Therefore the agreements innately have high potentials to upgrade political and diplomatic cooperation between member states involved.⁴⁷ The key point is that regional trade agreements as an intermediation variable can create a high degree of complimentary cooperation networks in economic, diplomatic and security issue areas.

All in all, participating states in FTAs can further strengthen their political and economic influence, and gradually negotiating capacity toward other states as well. Taking advantage of these environments, they can conclude various FTAs with important states holding strategic significance or potentially growing states. With these leverages, they can tackle with more potential powers -- such non-traditional security issues as international terrorism, illegal immigration, money laundry, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and damage to environment.

Another idea for the two-track security cooperation framework lies in the fact that the six-party nuclear talks, to which the ROK, the US, China, Japan, and Russia have participated this far, have proved failure. The EU, once a member of

⁴⁶ John Ravenhill, "Regionalism," in John Ravenhill (ed.) *Global Political Economy*, Second edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp173-79.

⁴⁷ Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict", *International Organization*, 2000, p.54.

the executive board, supported, with the non-negligible financial donations, the construction of the two light water reactors in North Korea. It is ironically not normal that the EU as a first supranational actor has been excluded from the six-party talks. This writer has consistently insisted that it should join the multilateral talks, but it did not participate in them. The EU could have yielded a high voltage pressure on North Korea should it had joined them earlier. In recent years, North Korea has carried out two nuclear tests and missile test launchings. This means in reality that North Korea can threaten the peace and security on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia anytime. Possibility of automatic regime change in Pyongyang, mainly coupled with the succession of power from Kim Jeong il to his third son Kim Jeong woon, has constantly increased. This has also augmented contingency on the peninsula, which will damage peace, stability in the region, and sustainable growth infrastructures of the bilateral FTA as a whole.

As to a globalized idea for the two-track security framework, the G-20 Summit as an epoch-making event to the ROK is going to establish a new cooperation relationship in the globalized world. Following the G-20 Summit in Pittsburg in 2009, the South Korea government is resolved to host the fifth G-20 in Seoul this November. It already announced its vision of “low carbon, green growth.” It signals a new era for “sustainable growth model.” The G-20 Summit, which has now taken a global governance role, is setting up a new agenda to respond to new challenges. The President Lee Myung-back government won applauses and confidence from the participants in the 15th U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen by emphasizing the spirit of “me first” in his keynote speech. For this sublime global goal, the government is scheduled to propose three issues that need to be fully discussed at the forthcoming G-20 Seoul summit: first, the adoption of the “Seoul Declaration”; second, the concept of the “World Green Fund”; and third, the promotion of the “Green for All Program.”

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The G-20 cooperation process is another bond to connect security and sustainable growth in the globalized world that now can no longer be separated. The green growth can bear greater fruits with security environment guaranteed in the emerging and emergent economies. It will not reach its final goals with money and technology alone. Major EU economic powers now are destined to join the fifth process, in which the ROK government is preparing a “Green R&D Master

⁴⁸ Diplomacy, Vol. XXXVI, No.3, Seoul, Korea, 2010, p.32.

Plan” and draw up ways to share its economic development experience with developing countries, helping them support themselves through innovation in industry and science & technology.⁴⁹

As to the last but a more facilitating idea for the two-track security design, the torpedo attack by North Korea on the South Korean warship Cheonan should be mentioned. The attack is the most serious incident – the most horrifying underwater terror act.⁵⁰ The warship was performing routine patrols in the western sea border—far from the Northern Limit Line, without provocations toward North Korea. The attack occurred as part of the continuing terrorisms in the sea, which may put in jeopardy any patrolling warships and civil ships in peaceful navigation. This calamity is of course one of the deadliest provocations since the 1950–53 Korean War. Such terrorisms can never be deterred by a single flexible strategy of a single nation but by a combined security strategy of all civilized and democratic countries. The North Korean torpedo attack violated two historical agreements—on the one hand, the Armistice Agreement of the 195–53 Korean War that aimed to ban all hostilities (article 2) and the 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement that was designed to ban mutual acts of aggression (articles 1 and 2) and not to resort to the use of military force against the other nation (article 9), and on the other, the UN Charter (article 2, paragraph 4). Considering the series of the breach of international and regional agreements by North Korea, and of continuing terrorisms on the Korean Peninsula by it from now on, pillars of EU’s security

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.34.

⁵⁰ The Korea Herald, Chosun Daily, and JoongAng Daily, May 20–21, 2010; The York Times and International Herald Tribune May 20, 2010; The final report of the international investigation team revealed that a North Korean torpedo was responsible for sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan on March 26, 2010 in the western waters south of the inter-Korean maritime border. The torpedo attack tore the corvette into two, killing 46 sailors. The torpedo was identified as the one manufactured in North Korea. The multinational probe team composed of American, Britain, Australian, Swedish, and South Korean experts presented the simulation test results and torpedo parts collected from the scene of the sinking, and the torpedo with an explosive weight of 200–300 kilograms generated the explosion, which occurred at a depth of six to nine meters, roughly three meters left of the center of the ship’s gas turbine room. The North Korea’s Committee for Peaceful Reunification of Korea said that the “South Korean puppet group is using the sinking as golden opportunity for pushing North–South relations to a catastrophe.” Making the fiction that the accident was caused by the fait accompli from its beginning, the group cried out for countermeasures and retaliation,” the committee claimed. North Korea reaction came after half an hour into a televised news conference in Seoul by the multilateral investigation team: North Korea’s National Defense Commission said in a statement that any sanctions or retaliation over the sinking would be met with “tough measures including an all-out war.”

cooperation in particular are required in the efforts to develop the insecure peninsular security environment into a stable and lasting peace environment.

VI. Prospects: Tentative suggestions

Considering the achievements made over the past 20 years or less, the EU and South Korea are assessed as having created an environment favorable for fully addressing possibilities of the two-track security framework. Both partners will have higher expectations on future mutual economic benefits and set up various mechanisms to balance their interests in broad issue areas with various negotiating means. Moreover, they will be inclined to build more divergent channels capable of easing tensions and conflicts, which in consequence will help shape higher expectations between the two partners and thus make more new norms and regulations in efforts to dynamically operate the bilateral FTA concluded.

From the viewpoint of guaranteeing and stepping up the FTA, the EU is expected to be first engaged more in its commitment to peace and security on the peninsula, while simultaneously increasing shared interests in the broad issue areas for the years to come. This is an inevitable linkage of FTA and security cooperation for both regions.

From the geopolitical viewpoint, the EU can gradually increase its political and diplomatic influence in the Northeast Asian countries – especially China, Japan, and Taiwan. These three countries have been vital political, diplomatic, economic, and security partners to South Korea. The EU is expected to establish footholds in South Korea, which later will help the EU foster favorable relations with the three countries. This signals of course a step towards newly and dynamically developing political, diplomatic and security order for both, far beyond economic cooperation.

From the viewpoint of future FTA operations and their success to be followed, the EU will negotiate with the three countries with more confidence and more negotiating capacities. This environment will provide the EU with more opportunities to easily tackle difficulties in future FTA talks with them.

From a diplomatic–security standpoint in particular, the EU can easily launch its preventive diplomacy to effectively deal with any challenges both on the EU and Northeast Asian levels, and later on East Asian level. Challenges may come from any regions and any outside forces whether they might be competitors,

rogue states, regional and transnational terrorists, or illegal financial actors capable of breaking the international economic regulations and norms. A new diplomatic–security perception expected from the reciprocal profits of the Korea–EU FTA is most likely to breed a new and far–reaching economic development vision in the 21st century.

In a word, the two–track security cooperation framework is worth being seriously considered between high–profile decision makers of both sides in time with the FTA taking effect. Consideration has to be given to them in the context of strengthening the present ROK–US Alliance. The EU can thus extend its security cooperation as an important actor of peacekeeping, peacemaking, crisis management, and humanitarian aid within the current alliance system. It is likely to launch an EU independent actor of security to South Korea backed by CFSP. It is desirable that the EU and the ROK will first establish a regular channel for security dialogue which in turn will foster a very close cooperative strategic linkage between both parties. Establishing this channel will likely give a high–voltage pressure to North Korea, eventually letting it give up terrorism and returning to the interrupted six–party talks. This two–track security cooperation framework will therefore create lasting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia/East Asia.